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THESIS ABSTRACT
This thesis recognizes the social costs created by privately driven urban development while also acknowledging cities' fiscal dependence
on local property taxes. This study is based on the premise that equitable spatial distribution of affordable housing can alter existing social
perceptions and norms while providing a better quality of life to residents with less income capacity. Using as case studies the linkage and
inclusionary policies in Boston, this thesis advocates for the need to include spatial emphasis in policies related to urban development. This
proposal derives from an analysis and findings that show the concentration of affordable housing in some of the city's most impoverished
neighborhoods. Based on the goals of income integration and poverty deconcentration as framed by the US Department of Housing and
Urban Development and by the Mayor's agenda for the City of Boston, I examine income integration patterns in the city through time and
analyze how affordable housing created with the assistance of linkage funds and though the inclusionary policy has supported or refuted
prevailing spatial income patterns in the city. Although this thesis ultimately questions whether income integration is the appropriate goal
for fostering spatial equity, it offers policy reform suggestions that could support a greater "geography of opportunity" for the city's lower-
and middle- income residents. The recommended policy reforms extend beyond these two policies in order to question the larger urban
development regime and the role of local level government interventions.
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PROLOGUE
DEMYSTIFYING THE EQUITY DRAMA
On March 4, 2011 in an afternoon lecture by David Harvey at Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
I was reminded of why I returned to graduate school to gain a degree in Urban Planning, and I felt a
renewed commitment to the ethos and ideals of the planning practice I hope to follow. Professor Harvey
briefly illustrated the social inequality issues created by the very robust system of capitalism that we know
and experience. The social crisis that he described was not just a critique of the system. It also provided
the framework through which to question the responsibility of both the capitalistic system itself and the
government within which that system operates to address the outcomes of the social inequality it generates.
According to Harvey, if the social implications of a capitalistic system are not internalized within that same
system, they do not simply go away; they are just left for the government to address and resolve. If a
government, asked to respond to the social inequality created by an unregulated capitalistic system in
place, declares inability (due to inadequate resources) to assume that responsibility, does not that mean
that capital is simply subsidized to create a favorable environment for the few "haves" while leaving at risk
the many "have-nots"?
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Ultimately, David Harvey did not base his argument of the responsibility to address social cost on ethics,
values, or principles. He simply demystified the processes within which social cost emerges and identified
the actors that create it and those upon which it is inflicted. His argument does not leave room to debate
or negotiate either whether someone (and if so, who?) should assume the responsibility for addressing
social cost and mitigating its impacts. This thesis asserts that government not only has the responsibility to
account for the implications of social inequality in a system, but also must recognize its capacity to mandate
ways that inequality outcomes can be internalized by the capitalistic system that creates them. Therefore,
this research examines the strengths and challenges of two local government attempts to cause the private
market to internalize social spatial inequity issues created by private urban development: the linkage policy
and the inclusionary policy, both crafted and implemented by the city of Boston. Both policies rely on
private development exactions in order to create affordable housing in the city of Boston.
The planning profession's ethical principles, as outlined in the American Planning Association's website
including the American Institute of Certified Planners (AICP) Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct,
mandate that planning processes must "continuously pursue and faithfully serve the public interest." The
AICP Code asks planners to "strive to expand choice and opportunity for all persons, recognizing a special
responsibility to plan for the needs of disadvantaged groups and persons." (American Planning Association
HTTP) However, I have come to understand that not all citizens conceive of "public interest" in the same
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way, and its definition emerges from local political and ideological norms. This ambiguity requires the
local planner to assume the responsibility and authority for its definition. Moreover, the planner's advocacy
responsibilities imply that local government planners possess political power: power that could allow them
to overcome or alter, rather than merely follow, the system's market dynamics and federal or state political
agendas.
If the government's values and goals were explicitly defined, the role and responsibilities of the local
government planner would not be so perplexing or nebulous. I find such ambiguity evident in the use of
the terms "government" and "welfare government." The use of "welfare government" to refer to a separate
system designed to help families with little or no income raises (at a minimum) concern and creates
uncertainty as to whether or not "government" alone assumes such responsibility. If it does, doesn't using
a special term to address the needs of those within the lower-income levels automatically call into question
the responsibility and role of "government"? If it does not, then what is "government" and what does it do?
Despite my view that even using the special term "welfare government" exposes a political and social
dilemma, part of the right-wing agenda denounces the very purpose of the welfare government. This
agenda is based on an ideology that market forces dictate the just organization of social life and the belief
that "the market is the best way to achieve the most just and the most rational forms of social organization."
(Harvey 1992, 597) That ideology became even more prominent and credible because of the collapse of
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numerous socially driven economies worldwide (Harvey 1992, 597). Most recently, the Tea Party Movement,
which advocates for free markets and limited federal government intervention, has gained momentum.
Demonstrations throughout the county attract not only substantial number of people but also the attention
of the national news. However, how credible is it to argue that unregulated, market-driven economies are
fortified against an economic collapse? The very fact that just two years ago the national government
rushed to prevent the banks from bankruptcy using taxpayers' money begs the question of whether a
"welfare market" has now emerged. Even if, for argument's sake, this is true, the "welfare market" has
demonstrated that it has much greater leverage on the government than the "welfare government" has
ever achieved.
For the purpose of this research, I recognize the complexity of the political power structure within which
local government planners operate. The control that state level decisions and fiscal policies have over
local governments is implied in Massachusetts' 1980s reputation as "Taxachusetts," which resulted from
high income tax rates and in "Proposition 2 ," which limits property tax increases. As a point of departure
for this thesis research, the conversation about what government is, or isn't, is neither debatable nor
negotiable. I simply define the role of the "government" (not that of the "welfare government") as one that
in part aims to provide the same opportunity to all people, of all income levels.
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Anchored in that definition, and driven by the advocacy responsibilities inherent in the planning
profession, I study the spatial implications of two local-level, redistributive policies-the linkage policy and
the inclusionary policy-crafted to increase the city's ability to create affordable housing and to promote
income integration within Boston. However, in this thesis I avoid discussions of welfare policies and purely
Marxist ideologies, as I do not necessarily believe that these proposals come without many limitations and
unintended implications. Most importantly, I do not believe that advocating for giving resources to those
who do not have them and advocating for creating an opportunity that allows people to help themselves
(and hence to improve their own lives) are of equal value. The basis for the spatial analysis derives from the
lens of income integration. The goal of income integration is a goal not only for the city of Boston (Sheila
Dillon, personal interview, March 2011), it has also been gaining prominence in the US Housing and Urban
Development agenda for over a decade (Goetz 2000, 157).
PROLOGUE 13

"[...] any successful strategy must appreciate that spatial form and social
process are different ways of thinking and talking about the same thing."
David Harvey, Social Justice and the City (2009), pg 26.
URBAN PLANNING AND SPATIAL EQUITY
1. 1 THE (IN)EQuITY OF SPATIALLY FLIMSY POLICIES
"The Clarendon was built for the luxury market and luxurious it
is," broadcasted the Real Estate Boston Connoisseur newspaper
in February 2010. Located in the heart of Back Bay, next to an
MBTA Orange Line subway station, in close proximity to the
Boston Public Library and Copley Square, amid shops, cafes and
restaurants, the Clarendon mixed-use development, completed
in November of 2009, offers a luxurious lifestyle and a scenery
full of amenities, familiar to the neighborhood's residents. Yet it
provides an unfamiliar setting for the thirty-six rental low-income
apartments and the one homeownership higher-middle income
condo it includes (Leading the Way Database, 2010). Back Bay
is also an unfamiliar residential territory for the many low- middle-
and moderate-income residents of the city.
The market rate condominium sales of the Clarendon have
been ranging from $700,000 to $2 million (Boston Homes,
2010) and reflect the project's total development cost of about
$130 million (Leading the Way Database, 2010). The thirty-six
affordable apartments are located amid market rate apartments,
renting for up to $5,500 per month (Warren Residential Group,
Boston Real Estate Sales and Leasing, 2011). The Clarendon
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Chapter
development was first proposed in 2005; negotiations with
BRA during the Article 80 large project review process and
compliance with Boston's inclusionary policy (which requires the
inclusion of affordable units within market rate developments of
over 10 units requiring zoning relief) resulted in the final mixed-
income program.
However, the case of Clarendon is not representative of the
locations of affordable units in the city. Sheila Dillon (Housing
Advisor to Mayor Menino) said during a personal interview that
"a city's goal is income integration within each development
and within the city's urban environment." (Sheila Dillon, personal
interview, March 2011) However, my hypothesis is that the non-
spatial emphasis of current policies (even those that aim to
address social inequality and expand benefits to residents of less
income capacity) has unintended spatial inequity implications.
The case of the Clarendon development is interesting, noteworthy,
but unusual.
Driven by equity ideals, the main objectives of this thesis are
two-fold. First, I hope to increase awareness of the spatial equity
implications that the non-spatial emphasis of current policies can
generate. Second, I intend to explore the power and limitations of
local government planning interventions in addressing spatial (in)
equity challenges. Moreover, I aim to identify whether, when, and
under what circumstances better spatial equity policy outcomes
could be achieved at the city level and to suggest possible policy
reforms that place a stronger emphasis on spatial equity. Lastly,
recognizing constraints imposed by the US federalist system on
local level social redistribution, I suggest specific changes to the
linkage and inclusionary policies (policies that this thesis uses
as a basis for spatial equity discussions), as well as reforms to
city-level, urban development norms that may result in greater
spatial equity outcomes.
Rooted in my argument that government should provide
equal opportunity for all residents of all income-levels is
the inherent tension between the goals underlying privately
driven development and the goals framing local governments'
undertakings. On one hand, the "wealth maximization principle"
of individual investors guides the development strategies of
the private sector. On the other hand, the local governments'
goals and responsibilities to serve the public interest, among
many other outcomes, result in the creation of policies like those
explored in this thesis. "Thus, planners appear caught in an in-
soluble dilemma-either leave the market to take its course or
impose an oxymoronic diverse order." (Fainstein 2005, 6)
Moreover, besides their local formation, administration, and
implementation, both the linkage and inclusionary policies rely
on the use of private funds-gained in the form of development
exactions-to create public benefit outcomes, which in this case
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is the creation of affordable housing in the city. Local revenue
relies heavily on property and income taxes within each city's
boundaries; therefore, local governments are often at odds with
the objective to advocate for public interest and with the need
to maintain a positive development climate for the private sector.
As part of this thesis I explore this fine balance between these
two, potentially contradictory, objectives that Boston's local
government has to consider. I hope thereby to further planners'
understanding of the public and private negotiations and
dynamics relevant to local-level, redistributive policies calling for
private development exactions.
My argument recognizes the scarcity of resources available
for the provision of affordable housing. It also appreciates the
limitations of local level redistributive policies and the challenges
ingrained in balancing the quantity and the quality of affordable
housing. However, I argue that for policies to remain true to
the economic integration goals of the city's population, policy
makers and planners need, at a minimum, to periodically invite
scrutiny of the spatial equity implications that policies cultivate
over time. Furthermore, Boston's unique economic strength and
market environment allows for an exploration of progressive
policies and an examination of the local government's capacity
to negotiate with the private sector, perhaps beyond what can be
proposed in many other US cities.
Cities operate within the limitations offered by federal and state
rules; therefore, redistributive policies may be more effective
if formed and administered at a higher level of governance.
"The current legal structure does not grant autonomy to any
local governments. Instead, it grants them some substantive
powers but denies them others." (Frug and Barron 2008, 35)
However, urban living is essentially experienced at the city
level and city-level decisions have a direct and more immediate
impact on citizens' lives. Moreover, cities have the ability to
generate innovation at the local level (Fainstein 2010, 177).
As demonstrated in the case of Boston, local governments do
at least assert their intention of addressing and responding
to matters of equity and redistribution. While recognizing that
Boston's case is not universally applicable, a goal of this thesis
is to assess the local government's ability to form and implement
such redistributive policies. This thesis also aims to identify
possible limitations and strengths of the implementation of these
two policies. Subsequently, it suggests that potential future
partnerships among city agencies and programs, or between
Boston's and adjacent municipalities' planning agencies, could
strengthen the spatial equity outcome of local level redistribution.
URBAN PLANNING AND SPATIAL EQUITY 17
This thesis can inform planning processes and policies
beyond the context of Boston through: the spatial emphasis
introduced in the methodology for evaluating the policies; some
broader considerations regarding public-private negotiations
during the development process; and the exploration of the local
government's role in regulating private market and investment
outcomes.
1. 2 A TIMELY DISCUSSION OF LOCAL LEVEL
REDISTRIBUTION
Taxation, regulation, and government spending approaches
depend on the political and ideological agenda of the party
governing the nation. The post-1 973 era in the US has witnessed
the unwillingness or inability of both Congress and the White
House to help cities mitigate the social impact of fiscal austerity
(Frieden and Sagalyn 1991, 291). Federal government budget
cuts during the Reagan era (1981-1989) were one of many
indicators of a conservative and capitalistic social-policy agenda.
Although federal-level policies directly affect the social spending
capacity of local governments, the formation of the linkage policy
in Boston in 1986 reveals the desire of city-level governments to
realize social policy agendas beyond the intentions of the federal
government. The more recent establishment of the inclusionary
policy in Boston in 2000, during Clinton's presidency, suggests
that local governments need to address redistribution at the local
level, even under more socially favorable federal fiscal agendas.
Earlier this year, President Obama, leading what was hoped
to be a liberal government with a Republican-majority Congress
in place since February 19, 2011, announced the 2011 annual
federal budget. In an attempt to decrease the national debt,
the Office of Management and Budget prepared a 2011
federal budget that decreases significantly the availability of
resources for social policies. Specifically, 7.5 percent (or $300
million relative to current funding levels) has been cut from the
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program (Office
of Management and Budget HTTP). The foreseen consequences
of the cuts have created anxiety and unrest among city planners.
In Boston's first public hearing to discuss plans for the projected
allocation of housing and community development funds from
the US Department of Housing and Urban Development, held at
the City's Department of Neighborhood Development on March
10, 2011, the conversation was dominated by the anxiety of local
government officials and the unease of city residents facing
increased needs.
Local-level redistributive policies do not necessarily thrive
under fiscally conservative federal policies. Yet, it is evident
that redistribution at the local level, used either as a reactive
18 INVESTING (IN) EQUITY
or a proactive measure, is likely to become more prominent
or even necessary on the planning agenda of cities-at least
those with strong local markets. Evidently, cities may not
always have the opportunity to rely on federal and state funds
for adequate provision of social services and redistribution of
resources. However, during times of fiscal austerity cities are
more highly pressed for social policies that speak to issues of
equity. Moreover, it is at the local level that fiscal austerity and
funding cuts have a more visible impact on communities and
that community advocates often vigorously demand government
action.
Policies formed and administered to promote redistribution
at the local level are likely to become increasingly important
in order to mitigate the detrimental effects of conservative
federal and state fiscal policies on the lower-income people of a
community. Such redistributive policies also seek to correct the
social cost burden created by larger scale failures. Moreover,
when implemented under liberal federal and state policies,
local-level redistribution may reverse long-standing, well-rooted
urban inequality. This thesis acknowledges the different federal
conditions within which the linkage and inclusionary policies
emerged in Boston as well as the different policy modifications
that occurred due to shifting economic conditions.
1. 3 THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis is organized in the following chapters.
CHAPTER 1 provides an overview of how market-driven, private
development creates social spatial segregation and inequality.
This chapter critiques the "growth machine" and the "political
machine" agendas that guide urban development. It concludes
with arguments about why diversity is important and why
planners' advocacy of diversity has been central to the planning
profession.
CHAPTER 2 explains how the importance of housing location
affects people's quality of life and creates what Xavier Briggs
calls the geography of opportunity. By examining Boston's
urban landscape and neighborhood affordability levels, this
chapter provides the basis for understanding Boston's housing
affordability crisis and its geographic connotations. Lastly,
it provides an overview of the city's response to the housing
affordability issues it has been facing.
CHAPTER 3 provides a basis for understanding how private
exactions can address redistribution at the local level. The main
intention of this chapter is to examine two policies: the linkage
policy and the inclusionary zoning policy. These policies have
been formed and implemented at the local level in many US
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municipalities. Greater emphasis is put on the way these two
policies have been formed and implemented within Boston's
unique political and urban development environment. Both
policies were crafted to mitigate social inequality outcomes
associated with privately driven urban development through two
main goals: increasing the city's capacity to provide affordable
housing and promoting income integration within the city's urban
landscape.
CHAPTER 4 analyzes the spatial distribution of affordable
housing created through the contribution of linkage funds and
the inclusionary policy in Boston. It assesses the spatial income
distribution in the city's urban landscape since 1980-before the
creation of any of the two policies-until 2010 through census data
at the block-group level. Although spatial income distribution
within the city is contingent on factors far beyond these two city-
level policies' outcomes, this chapter assesses whether income
integration within the city's urban landscape has been achieved.
Furthermore, it examines whether either of the two policies has
supported or deferred greater income integration within Boston.
CHAPTER 5 aims to: a) provide possible answers or guidance
on how potential future changes in the policies can place
greater emphasis on creating mixed income developments and
neighborhoods to attain the city's income integration goal and,
b) to unveil some of the barriers to achieving income integration
through the linkage and inclusionary policies. Moreover, this
chapter offers suggestions for how goals of economic integration
can be more aggressively pursued through broader urban
development reform efforts.
1. 4 How DOES URBAN DEVELOPMENT CREATE
SPATIAL (IN)EQuITY?
The Urban Development Regime
Many cities, very much like Boston, view the physical
development and redevelopment of downtown areas not only as
the solution to a city's fiscal prosperity and economic development
but also as a prerequisite to a city's regional significance. As
a result, many cities direct much attention and resources to
downtown development and redevelopment efforts. Desiring
to increase their tax base and hence their fiscal capacity-an
objective directly attributable to the decentralized, neoclassical
and capitalistic framework within which urban settings exist and
regenerate-cities place great emphasis on attracting private
investment in their downtowns (Frieden and Sagalyn 1991, 7).
In addition, as market forces follow public investments, and the
central location of downtown areas is attractive for businesses,
market driven commercial and office developments tend to be an
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outcome not only of public subsidies offered but also of market
desires. Hence, many cities are characterized by a concentration
of high-end and commercial developments in downtown areas
and also a disparity of property values between downtown and
urban neighborhood areas.
In the 1960s, fearing that blight would spread from one
building to another, cities chose "radical surgery to remove all
blighted properties at once" (Frieden and Sagalyn 1991, 41). The
new downtown development projects, built on the cleared sites,
were large, typically with a single function or use, and designed
to promote isolation from the surrounding areas (Frieden and
Sagalyn 1991, 42). Federal subsidies of large infrastructure
projects supported much of the downtown development at the
time. The implications of the urban renewal era for the cities'
lower-income residents have since been widely criticized and
have significantly stigmatized the planning profession. Moreover,
speculative downtown commercial development in some cases
did not result in the positive economic impact that it aimed to
create (Frieden and Sagalyn 1991, 88-89).
In the 1980s, downtown development and redevelopment
activity occurring in downtowns nationwide was portrayed
as "urban revitalization" or "urban renaissance." It was often
partially publicly funded through either direct subsidies or tax
abatements. Ironically, at the same time, many of the cities
experiencing rigorous downtown development were also
experiencing rising unemployment and increasing poverty
levels (Krumholz 1999, 90-91). The public resources allocated
to such development provided clear benefits to developers but
the success that downtowns were claiming did not seem to
result in economic benefits for the city's neighborhood residents
(Krumholz 1999, 85). There was a belief that the investment in
downtown areas would help cities increase their tax base and
hence their fiscal capacity and ability to provide public services
to all residents-what has become known as a "trickle down"
approach to prosperity and economic development. This belief
has since been exposed as a myth (Krumholz 1999, 91-93).
However, the linkage program that emerged in Boston in the
mid-1980s demonstrates a city-level attempt to link downtown
profits with greater neighborhood benefits. This program would
have not been initiated without the downtown real estate boom
that the city experienced.
Specifically, research on nine cities that directed their
attention to downtown office development from 1950 to 1984 (a
popular city response to the shifting economy characterized by
losses in manufacturing and industrial jobs) revealed that such
development did not translate to positive income and economic
benefits for the city's overall population. In particular, between
1970 and 1980, four of the cities included in the research
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(Atlanta, Baltimore, New York, and Philadelphia) showed intense
downtown development trends. At the same time these four
cities were among the ten worst-off cities in the U.S based on an
index that accounts for unemployment levels, poverty rates, and
changes in real income (Frieden and Sagalyn 1991, 288).
Despite the recognized failures and criticisms, many planners
and scholars are hesitant to discount rigorous downtown
commercial and office activity as a valid strategy. Efforts to
increase cities' fiscal capacity imply more taxable land uses and
higher tax rates. As cities do not dictate the national economy
and the sources allocated for social policies but are significantly
impacted by them, there is only partial truth in casting the
blame for creating urban inequality on city level governments'
development decisions (Frieden and Sagalyn 1991, 290).
However, private wealth is generated through a system of public
subsidies, permissions, and adequate public infrastructure,
which defines the growth machine regime. Under that regime,
private interests ultimately guide local government leverage
(Logan and Molotch 2007). "The mobility of private capital
forces local officials to cater to the needs of the private sector
in order to attract the investment necessary to maintain the local
economy. "(Goetz 1994, 86)
The questions that local governments have not explicitly been
investigating when supporting development projects are "How
is the public interest served when the city trades uncollected
property taxes that provide social and educational services for
the lower-income people, for physical development that provides
benefits for 'higher-income' people?" and "Who gains and who
loses as a result of downtown development?" (Krumholz 1999,
83) As will be presented in chapter 3, such questions became
prominent among Boston's community advocates and dominated
the city's progressive government agenda.
Questions of equity however, can best be addressed on a
systematic basis rather than on a case-by-case basis, through
the development of downtown plans that provide a framework for
more just and physically enhanced cities (Keating and Krumholz
1991, 136). Downtown plans not only can foster the coordination
of public programs but can also prevent the translation of
downtown planning to "deal making" that tends to cater to private
development desires and often ignores the public benefits that
could or should accompany it. Though social problems may not
seem directly linked to downtown developments, they cannot
remain unaddressed or be solved apart from downtown plans
(Keating and Krumholz 1991, 137).
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Although creating a downtown plan does not mean either that
it will include strategies for redistribution of public benefits or that
it will result in greater equity upon implementation, Boston has
avoided the development of downtown comprehensive plans
altogether. The downtown development politics of the city have
demonstrated an inclination to create an attractive environment
for private investment. Hence, it is likely that the formation of a
comprehensive downtown plan has been deliberately avoided,
as merging private with overall community interests can be a
highly contentious process. Yet Boston has also demonstrated
the desire to create synergies between downtown development
and public benefits. Evidence of this is both the linkage and
inclusionary policy. However, the success of both policies is
based on the success of speculative downtown development
and "deal making" development practices. The lack of an overall
comprehensive plan for Boston's downtown may have allowed
the city to maintain an inviting environment for private investment
but it is likely that has also compromised the outcomes of the
city's social redistributive policies seeking to achieve equity
outcomes that far exceed in scope and complexity what these
policies alone can achieve.
Moreover, equity requires redistribution "of both material
and nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy that does
not favor those who are already better off at the beginning."
(Fainstein 2010, 36-37) Furthermore, "[...] equity does not require
that each person be treated the same, but rather that treatment
is appropriate. In this interpretation, distributions that result from
market activities are included; they are considered to be within
the realm of public policy since the choice of leaving allocations
to the market is a policy decision." (Fainstein 2010, 36)
Recognizing a city's dependence on property taxes generated
within its municipal boundaries, I take for granted that the notion
that urban (in)equity should not lead to a binary opposition of
"for" or "against" development strategies. Rather, urban (in)
equality should prompt a call for considering the multiple
implications of urban development projects. Today the negative
social cost outcomes of urban development are very different
from those of previous decades. In the 1950s and 1960s urban
renewal meant the direct displacement of the city's lower-income
residents. In the 1980s the focus on single-use mega-projects
and their architectural expression made exclusion evident.
Currently, urban development has mixed (often ambiguous and
speculative) outcomes, which makes it harder not only to build
community opposition but also to convincingly argue against
it, especially when social programs, such as the linkage and
inclusionary development policy examined in this thesis, are
based on resources resulting from urban development.
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During his MIT lecture, Professor Harvey attributed
communities' current lack of concern over development decisions
to the "spectacle qualities" that characterize urban development
interventions today. The notion of fiscal dependence on growth
has generated the "ideology of value-free development" (Logan
and Molotch 2007, 60) and the "[ ...] celebration of local growth
continues to be a theme in the culture of localities. Schoolchildren
are taught to view local history as a series of breakthroughs in
the expansion of the economic base of their city and region,
celebrating its numerical leadership in one sort of production or
another." (Logan and Molotch 2007, 61) Local media, acting as
cheerleaders, portray "[...] colorful pictures and sorties of new
construction, redevelopment, and the arrival of upper-income
residents downtown." (Krumholz 1999, 85) Hence, public
sentiment and pride often evolve around the notion of growth.
However, those people involved in local affairs often have a
personal interest in land use and development decisions, and
although they might not have the power to decide where to
direct private investment, they hold great leverage over local
governments. As a result, the public have mixed feelings about
growth and "[...] political structures are mobilized to intensify
land uses for private gain of many sorts." (Logan and Molotch
2007, 65)
David Harvey attributed the failure of social policies largely to
the inability of the country's socialistic and left-wing movements
to clearly articulate goals and strategies. These movements also,
according to Harvey, do not possess the flexibility and resilience
that characterize the capitalistic system. Yet his argument does
not have to be an intellectual, dead-end remark. Specifically,
it does not have to be translated as an inability to create and
implement social policies within the context of a dominant
capitalistic system. Furthermore, the dominance of a national,
socialistic regime does not need to be perceived as prerequisite
for addressing and mitigating social cost at the local level. The
first would be a purely pessimistic attitude, declaring defeat at
implementing much needed socially responsible and egalitarian
strategies. The second would be a very long-term and possibly
unachievable goal that, if deemed a prerequisite of implementing
any socially redistributive strategies, could negate any possible
action and ultimately penalize those most in need.
Harvey's argument can be interpreted as a call to action for
planners committed to "creating and expanding opportunity
for all residents" in identifying and scrutinizing more explicitly
the trade-offs between urban development benefits and
social costs. In addition, it requires government to develop a
greater ability to negotiate with the private sector. It ultimately
necessitates undertaking a "non-reformist reform" approach to
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urban development. This "non-reformist reform" approach, first
defined by Goetz (1967), imposes the questions of what "should
be," not what "can be," done. At the same time, it recognizes the
constraints imposed by the existing federalist system and the
prominence of the market forces in decision making. Undertaking
a "non-reformist reform" approach could ultimately result in
essential political and economic transformations (Linhorst 2002,
205).
The Misfortune of the Non-Spatial Emphasis in
Urban Planning
Evident in urban development attitudes and strategies is the
emphasis on economic forces, fiscal aims, and their associated
political complexities. Often equally evident isthe limited emphasis
placed on the spatial manifestation of urban development norms
and the resulting social implications associated with urban
development's consequential spatial organization. Provoked by
that recognition, David Harvey argues the need to recognize
that the establishment of any spatial organization tends in the
end to become institutionalized and hence to influence future
profiles of social processes (Harvey 2009, 27). Therefore, "[ ...]
any successful strategy must appreciate that spatial form and
social process are different ways of thinking and talking about the
same thing." (Harvey 2009, 26) In this thesis I accept Harvey's
argument that the power of spatial organization not only arises
from social dynamics but also engenders social structures.
Thus, I argue for the need to undertake a spatial approach to
evaluating policy outcomes, especially those outcomes resulting
from physical development policies and regimes.
Xavier Briggs points out the lack of spatial emphasis on
social policies as a missing element from the US social policy
agendas. Briggs recognizes the importance of social policies
and the controversy that affirmative action in education and the
job market has attracted. However, despite the implementation
of such social policies, Briggs recognizes the persistence
of inequality and the inability to respond to the increasing
national diversity among the US population. This persistence of
inequality is rooted in "the challenge to ensure that people of
all backgrounds enjoy access to housing in communities that
serve as steppingstones to opportunity, political influence, and
broader social horizons rather than as isolated and isolating
traps with second-class support systems." (Briggs 2005, 2-3)
However, the effectiveness of city-level strategies "[...]
depends on the national policy context in which they operate.
Without a national regime that is committed to equity, heightened
competitiveness of a particular city will likely only produce
polarization, and diversity may result in rivalry rather than
tolerance. (Fainstein 2005, 16). According to Fainstein, despite
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the limits that localism imposes, cities have the capacity to aim
for equity and justice in urban living when goals are framed
beyond the creation of affordable housing (through linkage,
inclusionary policy, and other subsidies strategies), to support
the human development capacity of city residents (through
means such as increased opportunity for education, fair labor
law standards, and antidiscrimination laws) (Fainstein 2005, 17).
Although Fainstein's advocacy of human capital development
is critical, the likelihood of achieving the policies she suggests
is possible only under progressive local governments, like the
one that Boston has been enjoying, characterized by a political
consciousness that also advocates for spatial equity.
Furthermore, more recently Fainstein argued that social
policies should intend for redistribution that is "not simply
economically, but also, as appropriate politically, socially, and
spatially" (Fainstein 2010, 36) and that "distributional equity
represents a particular concept of fairness in which policy aims
at bettering the situation of those who without state intervention
would suffer form relative deprivation." (Fainstein 2010, 37) In
lieu of initiating a conversation that could lead to oppositional
relationships between the multiple ways that social policies can
generate equity, I argue that a multi-approach equity strategy is
necessary. I also argue that, through a new spatial organization
that values equity, it is possible to increase opportunity for all
residents and to promote social and ideological change, at least
at the local level.
Spatial emphasis, through the prominence of "location theory"
is a well-known and acknowledged approach in urban economics
(DiPasquale and Wheaton 1996). Transportation costs determine
the location of employment centers, which in turn determine land
and housing values. The analytical purposes of such a model
are not problematic as they only reflect the degree to which
market economies shape urban spatial patterns and dynamics.
However, the use of such a model in determining or planning
for future land uses fails to consider the social costs imposed
upon those with less income capacity. Market economics alone
lack an incentive to factor social costs into economic models.
Nevertheless, under a "non-reformist reform" approach, city
policies do not have to merely follow market norms. In contrast,
they should strive to seek a new equilibrium that accounts for
the social cost of market development. City policies should also
address redistribution through the lens of the resulting spatial
organization that ultimately creates and perpetuates this cost.
This thesis presents an analysis of and recommendations for the
linkage and inclusionary policy of Boston with an emphasis on
the spatial implications of their implementation.
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1. 6 (WHY) Is DIVERSITY IMPORTANT FOR
PLANNERS?
The emphasis of the planning profession on matters of social
equity and justice is neither new nor unexpected. However, both
in academic discussions and in planning practice, identifying
an appropriate framework for planning interventions addressing
these very issues of social equity and justice does not necessarily
fully integrate physical development with social or economic
development polices. Often city planning agencies, as is the
case in Boston, have different departments or divisions that
deal with physical downtown development, urban design, the
creation or preservation of affordable housing, or with economic
development initiatives in the city. Sheila Dillon, housing advisor
to Mayor Menino, mentioned that city's efforts include the
integration of initiatives between the different departments. Once
such example is the coordination of the Public Works Capital
Improvement Projects and housing agencies in order to identify
areas in need of public improvements due to the foreclosure
concentrations deterioration (Sheila Dillon, personal interview,
March 2011). However, the diverse pull of funding sources
targeted specifically to certain initiatives and the specialized
projects developed within each department do not necessarily
encourage integrated planning strategies.
Furthermore, it has been my experience as a graduate student
in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning that attempts
to allow for specialization and to provide direction within the
broad field of planning lead to the formation of focus groups that
educate future planners with a different emphasis on priorities
and expertise. It is likely for a future planner without a design-
related degree or exposure to design education to practice in
local government and to be called upon to make development
decisions. As a result, planners are often divided between those
who advocate for "people-based" strategies (to direct resources
to human capital development, enabling individuals to become
mobile, to make their own choices and, by doing so, to improve
their quality of life) and those who advocate for "place-based"
strategies (to direct resources to the physical improvement of
the urban environment and, as a result, enhance the resources
offered to each community).
Specialization of education and expertise within the broad field
of planning is not only inevitable but also desirable in order to avoid
becoming a mere generalist. However, as urban environments
will inevitably continue to be developed, redeveloped, and
altered, it is imperative to re-bridge the gap between the people-
based and place-based strategies. Although an emphasis on
bridging this gap was also evident during the modernist urban
renewal era, its imperfect implementation and the remaining
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equity issues create an urgency to identify ways in which physical
development strategies can more effectively translate to people-
based community improvements and thereby contribute to the
production of more equitable urban landscapes.
A precondition for examining how spatial equity can be
fostered through physical urban development is defining the
term "spatial equity." Susan Fainstein, in her recent book The
Just City (2010), identifies equity, democracy, and diversity
as the prerequisite components of a Just City. However, she
recognizes that in planning practice all three elements do not
always complement each other. In such cases she suggests that
equity should be the one to prevail. Simply put, under Fainstein's
theoretical framework as portrayed in The Just City the term
equity in urban development emphasizes the outcomes rather
than the processes of development. This emphasis ultimately
begs the question: "Who is getting what from it?" Under that
framework, the notion of redistribution at the city level becomes
important, and the planners' role is elevated to one of advocacy.
Not surprisingly, recent academic discussions have evolved
around challenging Fainstein's ranking of equity outcomes over
democratic processes or diversity. Regardless of individual
ideological beliefs, it is difficult to disregard her argument that
participatory, focused planning processes-although having
dominated the agenda of advocacy planning over the last
twenty years-have proved inadequate at generating just urban
environments in the US (Fainstein 2010, 24). In this thesis, I do
not plan to enter this debate over which of the three elements
(equity, democracy, or diversity) deserves most attention.
Boston's linkage policy and the ongoing, inclusionary policy
modifications occurred through democratic processes (even
with all of their limitations and contradictions) and community
unrest over social justice issues. It is often through community
pressure that city governments craft and implement policies that
aim to address issues of justice and equity. Hence, at least in
the case of Boston, it is not convincing to suggest that goals of
equity and resulting social policies would have been part of the
city's (progressive) agenda without the democratic processes in
place that allow communities to voice their concerns and state
their demands.
Participatory planning emerged to counteract the urban
renewal efforts of the 1950s and 1960s. Planners and communities
believed that participatory processes had the capacity to
generate just and equitable plans and results. However,
participatory processes have not always generated either
equitable or just results. One can easily observe urban inequality
in today's US urban landscapes. Participatory processes have
been unable to address the implications of social and political
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power-structure dynamics embedded in all levels of social and
political functions-and have not provided the most effective
mode of achieving greater urban equity (Fainstein 2010, 24).
However, I find highly speculative Fainstein's assumption that
cities can achieve equity divorced from participatory processes.
Furthermore, such an assumption elevates the role of the local
government planner to a greater authority than it holds today or
that it could possibly achieve in the context of the US federal
system. Recognizing both the strength and weakness of her
theory, I find that arguments creating an adversarial relationship
between community engagement and equity implications are
possible only as an intellectual exercise. While I find Fainstein's
claim that participatory planning has been unable to generate
equitable solutions to date valid, I believe that her suggestion
that equity can emerge apart from democratic processes is
highly speculative. What is more risky is to take for granted that
a top-down planning approach, even if it were to exist, would not
have adverse implications.
As a framework for my study, I accept that a Just City
emerges, although not always in pure harmony, through
participatory processes where diversity is valued and where
equity manifests itself in the urban landscape. As such, I
trace the formation and initiation of both Boston's linkage and
inclusionary policies through time, recognizing the importance of
community organizers, political activists, and housing advocates
in the formation of these policies. Conversely, I use the notion
of spatial equity to measure the effectiveness of these two city-
level approaches by asking how they delineate and redistribute
"who gets what" out of free-market-driven, urban development in
Boston. Furthermore, when "state power is mobilized for elite
interests, effective democracy can counter its unjust effects"
and when "reformers manage to hold state power, justice might
be best achieved by allowing officeholders to make decisions."
(Fainstein 2010, 26). Hence, I trace the formation of the linkage
and inclusionary policies in the city's urban political regime to
discover their foundational basis and the circumstances that
could allow their further future expansion.
Cleveland, Ohio's equity planning agenda in the late 1960s
and through the 1970s, led by the director of the city planning
commission Norman Krumholz, demonstrated that local planners
have the capacity to affect equity outcomes in the city. In his
ten years with the city planning commission, Krumholz and
his staff managed to address issues of public transportation
mobility and accessibility, which had negatively impacted the
city's lower-income, elderly, or physically challenged. Krumholz
also questioned and upset the city's stance in providing tax
abatements to downtown developments (Krumholz 1982, 168-
170) However, Cleveland's equity and advocacy local planning
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agenda is not a widespread phenomenon. In Krumholz's opinion,
his work in Cleveland had a bigger impact on academics, who
incorporated it as an example in the teaching of the planning
profession, than on city planners, who tend to be conservative,
cautious, and averse to unpopular, public positions (Krumholz
1982, 172-173). Although that was true in the 1970s, nowadays
policies formed to foster equity goals are evident in cities with
progressive local governments. In Boston, although downtown
development is often speculative and planning practices have
been favorable to private investment, the case for equity has
been part of the city's agenda since the 1980s. Both the linkage
(1984) and inclusionary policy (2000) are evidence of at least
the city's desire to advocate for greater public benefits for its
residents with less income capacity.
Based on the assumption that urban environments tend
to host diverse populations, it becomes important to define
diversity and to determine why often it becomes an aspiration
but not necessarily an implication in planning. The use of the
term diversity has become a new guiding principle in urban
planning, mostly as the profession's reaction to urban-renewal-
era practices that stigmatized it. As such, the term is not
only inherently ambiguous but also "tends to lose sight of the
continued importance of economic structure and the relations
of production" and the possibility of creating prejudice when
people of incompatible lifestyles are compelled to share the
same environment (Fainstein 2005, 13-14).
Hence "diversity" may not be the only correct goal in planning.
Not only is its definition nebulous but also its advocacy invites
discussion between those who do and those who do not believe
in its value. Instead, advocating a clearly articulated connection
between social exclusion and economic exclusion can better
frame the investigation into how a non-diverse environment
inhibits the capacities of those who are excluded (Fainstein
2005, 14). Based on that recognition, the next chapter discusses
the "geography of opportunity" as framed by Xavier Briggs.
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"From 1999-2000 house prices jumped in Boston by 22%, more than 7 times the rate of
income growth [...] In 2000 only one in four Bostonians could afford an average-priced home
and asking rents had gone up 47% in just four years."
City of Boston, Leading the Way /// (2009), pg 7.
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2. 1 WHY IS HOUSING LOCATION IMPORTANT?
Issues of local, spatial (in)equity or (in)equality are affected by
factors far beyond the allocated housing subsidies distribution
and the affordable housing created within a city. The outcome
and scale of urban revitalization and community improvement is
a direct result of other decisions such as "capital flows across
city space, fair lending policies (to counter disparate treatment
or impacts in capital markets), tax treatment of various classes or
property, reforms in public school finance or enrollment (including
voucher-based 'choice' schemes and desegregation) and more"
(Briggs 2003, 920). However, to some extent local governments
are far less likely to be able to directly impact many of these
larger-scale decisions, which are often made on a regional,
state, or federal level. History has shown that redistribution
of resources cannot occur easily enough or fast enough on a
higher level of government (e.g. the national debate over the
most recent healthcare reform). Therefore, cities can extend
aspects of the opportunity offered to their most wealthy residents
to lower-income residents by creating housing options in areas
other than those with concentrations of poverty. Nevertheless,
localized place analysis and policies (if they are to be viable and
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resilient) need to account for the larger context within which they
exist (Briggs 2003, 921).
The spatial manifestation of urban inequality not only identifies
it but also contributes to its proliferation and perpetuation. Xavier
Briggs summarizes the primary and compounding effects and
mechanisms of spatial urban inequality in table 1:
The past two decades of national housing policy have
emphasized the benefits for lower-income residents that result
from improved location of housing. In 1994, the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) launched one of
the largest social experiments in the country. HUD sought to
discover the implications on quality of life and human capital
development of families that participated in voluntary relocation
from subsidized housing to privately owned units in low-poverty
neighborhoods. (Briggs, Comey, and Weismann 2010, 384).
This social experiment, widely known as Moving to Opportunity
(MTO), took place through the Housing Choice Voucher program
in five US cities, including Boston. MTO examined the housing
location preference of lower-income families in these five cities
and assessed the development of their lives. (Briggs 2010, 21;
Briggs, Comey, and Weismann 2010, 392) The study reveals
many affordable housing supply and demand barriers to
choosing the housing location (because of landlords accepting
the Housing Choice Voucher program through real estate
agents), as well racial and neighborhood quality complexities that
impacted the MTO's outcomes. However, the study concludes
that "many residents of distressed, high-crime neighborhoods
want the opportunity to escape those areas" (Briggs, Comey,
and Weismann 2010, 422).
2. 2 WHO CAN AFFORD To LIVE IN BOSTON AND
WHERE?
To effectively address urban spatial inequality, it is important
to identify the reasons that it exists and the mechanisms through
which it is perpetuated. These reasons include exclusionary
land use policies, market discrimination by sellers or lenders,
discrimination in subsidized housing, and segregative choices
by subsidized consumers (Briggs 2003, 933). A deeper historical
review and thorough research into the urban spatial inequality in
Boston today would uncover some of these factors. However,
my hypotheses regarding the main causes for the city's most
recent housing crisis and the spatial inequality implications it
has generated are: (a) the market forces as they relate to the
city's unique and strong labor market, (b) the strong housing
real estate spatial trends, (c) the scarcity of city-owned land in
higher income areas along with its abundance in lower-income
areas, and (d) the concentration of the affordable housing
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TABLE 1: PLACE EFFECT MECHANISMS
PRIMARY MECHANISMS EFFECTS
(FORMAL)
Spatial organization of Mismatch between job locations and housing concentrations of racial, income, or other groups
metropolitan labor market contributes to commuting barriers, job information loss, and less proximate, less useful job networks
opportunities to which the poor are connected.
Spatial organization of public Provides residents of different locations unequal access to quality services.services
Spatial organization of risk or Political decisions over environmental hazards as well as job generators, parks, and other positivesopportunity-generating land are unevenly dispersed.uses
MITIGATING OR COMPOUNDING EFFECTSINFORMAL MECHANISMS
The benefits and costs of While many social networks and civic attachments develop beyond the immediate neighborhood,
neighborly ties proximate social forces can contribute significant burden or aid.
Place of residence as a Disadvantaged neighborhoods and their residents obtain linked reputation or stigmas that act as
"signal" of worth and intent signals that shape perceptions, decisions, and opportunity-brokering by employers and real estateprofessionals. Similarly residents of higher status neighborhoods benefit from the opposite effect.
Spatial concentrations of Trauma, including violent crime and other behaviors, is highly concentrated physically, and limits
violent crime and other healthy human development and social functioning, parental willingness to leave children at home
trauma-producing risks and go to work, and even collective efficacy among neighbors to address shared problems.
MITIGATING OR COMPOUNDING EFFECTSFORMAL MECHANISMS
Spatial organization of Subsidized housing may shape where the disadvantaged live and concentrate the poor farther awaylimited-access "welfare state' from jobs, good schools, and services. Adapted from Xavier De Souza Briggs, 2003, page 926services
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created through subsidies in the city's lower-income areas. The
following sections explain in more detail how these four issues
have contributed to spatial income segregative patterns.
Boston's Labor Market
Boston's affordable housing crisis is neither new nor
undocumented. Between 1993 and 2000 the city of Boston
gained more than 105,000 new jobs. Although the rate of housing
creation doubled, during the same time, it did not prove enough
to keep up with the city's rising housing needs (City of Boston
and Menino 2009, 1). The unmet housing needs created by the
city's rising work-force led to a dramatic increase in housing sales
princes and rents. Characteristically, between 1999 and 2000
Boston's housing prices grew 22%, a rate seven times greater
than the rate of the city's population income growth during the
same period (City of Boston and Menino 2009, 1).
The last decade has been more erratic and cyclical for Boston's
labor market. During the recession from 2001 to 2004, Boston lost
44,576 jobs; from 2005 to 2008 (before entering the most recent
recession, the aftermath of which we currently observe), Boston
gained back 34,320 jobs (ES-202 data). Figure 1 illustrates the
changes in Boston's labor market from 2001 to 2009. From 2001
to 2009 the city's average annual wage increased in nominal
terms from $60,008 to $76,232 (ES-202 data), an increase of
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over 27% while the city's median household income increased
from $39,629 in 2000 to $40,171 in 2010, an increase of less
than 1.4%. Although annual average wages (because of the
aggregate nature of the figure) and median household income
are not directly comparable, due to the absence of median
wage data, the difference between the two rates of increase
suggests that Boston's strategies around the city's labor market
development provide disproportionate opportunities to the city
residents. Furthermore, commercial and office development
in Boston does not necessarily target job creation for the city's
residents.
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In the period from 2001 to 2009, the industries experiencing
the highest job losses were in manufacturing (8,872 jobs lost),
transportation and warehousing (8,314 jobs lost), finance
and insurance (6,446 jobs lost), professional and technical
services (5,870 jobs lost), and construction (5,585 jobs lost).
The healthcare and social assistance industry gained by far the
most jobs of any other industry experiencing gains, with a total
increase of 21,600 new jobs (ES-202 data).
Based on the annual employment and wage (ES-202 data)
information, Boston in 2009 offered 550,653 jobs characterized
by a great variation of wages. The average wage in all industries
was $72,532. The lowest average industry wage of $25,428
was observed in construction jobs, followed by the educational
services industry, which had an annual average wage of $30,628.
Professional and technical services jobs offered the highest
average industry wage of $163,072, followed by information
jobs with an annual average wage of $136,552, and finance
and insurance jobs with an annual average wage of $101,712.
Wholesale trade represented most jobs (almost 21 % of all jobs)
and had an average annual wage of $67,756. Figure 2 shows the
correlation between numbers of jobs and wages offered in each
sector of Boston labor market in 2009.
FIGURE 2: 2009 CITY OF BOSTON-CORRELATION OF NUMBER
OF JOBS AND WAGES
$200,001
$180,001
$160,001
$140,001
$120,001
$100,001
$80,001
$60,001
$40,001
$20,001
$1
Professional and Technical Services
,$163 ,0 72 - 72,328 (13.13%)
Financa and Insurance
*101,712 - 55,960 (10.16%)
--
0
letail Trade
;60,216- 46,794 (8.50%)
Wholesal ale
$67,756 - 115,576 (20.99%)
~blWuctcn
,428 - 46,172 (8.38%)
20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100.000 120,000 140,000
Census 2009, ES-202 Annual Data, Boston
THE RIGHT TO HOUSING AND TO THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY 35
Employment in the industries of wholesale trade, professional
and business services, finance and insurance, retail trade, and
construction comprised over 61 % of Boston's labor market. To
take a closer look at the wage dispersal and, therefore, the ability
of Boston's workforce to afford the high housing prices in the
city, a brief analysis of the annual wages within the city's most
popular industries using the 2009 ES-202 follows.
Within the wholesale industry over 50% of the jobs (4,111)
were merchant wholesalers in non-durable goods such as
grocery products and druggists' goods, with an annual average
wage of $73,164. Within the professional and business services,
over 59% of the jobs (55,960) were in professional and technical
services characterized by an annual average wage of $101,712
(more than 1.4 times higher than the overall annual wage). Within
that, legal services offered 14,887 jobs with an annual average
wage of $116,192 (more than 1.6 times the annual average
wage); in management and technical consulting services offered
10,425 jobs with an annual average wage of $130,052 (almost
1.8 times the annual average wage), and 7,820 jobs were in
scientific research and development with an annual average
wage of $70,460 (less than 0.93 times the annual average wage).
In addition 33.2% (31,694) of the professional services jobs were
administrative and support services with and annual average
wage of $42,769 (less than 0.57 times the annual average wage).
Within the finance and insurance industry, more than 45% of the
jobs (32,469) are in financial investment and the average annual
wage is $227,864 (nearly three times the overall annual average
wage). Within the retail trade industry over 27% of the jobs (7,169)
were in food and beverage stores with an average annual wage
of $22,048 (less than 0.29 times the annual average wage), and
more than 19% (5,184) were in clothing and accessories stores
with an annual average wage of $25,116 (less than 0.33 times
the annual average wage). Within the construction industry more
than 49% of the jobs were specialty trade contractors (5,230)
with an annual average wage of $72,020 (less than 0.95 times
the annual average wage).
36 INVESTING (IN) EQUITY
This thesis does not intend to build upon extensive and
complex research on and theories of labor-market inequality. The
brief overview provided here only intends to link planning and
urban development considerations and interventions with labor-
market dynamics. The city's struggle to house households of
moderate, middle, or lower income people is the city's challenge
to house its workforce population. The striking difference among
households' income capacity is based on people's different
ability to access jobs in the various industries. Therefore, housing
and urban development strategies need to consider these salary
disparities. Moreover, this wage disparity clarifies the need for
an affordable housing profile and the reasons that affordability
is a great challenge for Boston. Therefore, it makes government
intervention in addressing affordable housing needs explicitly
defendable.
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Boston's Real Estate Housing Market
Although, as illustrated earlier, from 2001 to 2009 Boston's
labor market did not grow as it did in the previous decade, the
median housing sales prices increased until 2005. As illustrated
in figure 3, overall median housing sales prices increased
between 2001 and 2009 with a rate of over 22% in nominal terms
(Department of Neighborhood Development, City of Boston
2011). Based on the 2000 and the 2010 estimates of the census
data, the city's median household income rose from $39,629 in
2000 to $40,171 in 2010, an increase of less than 1.4%, which is
far less than the 22% of the housing increase cost burden.
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FIGURE 4: 2001-2009 MEDIAN HOUSING SALES PRICES CHANGE PER NEIGHBORHOOD
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More importantly, the increase or
decrease in housing sales prices between
2001 and 2009 varied greatly within Boston's
neighborhoods. Figure 4 illustrates the
change in housing sales prices from 2001
to 2009 for each neighborhood, in nominal
terms, using as reference the change
observed in the city's median housing sales
price ($59,050). In eight neighborhoods,
median market-rate housing sales
prices increased more than in the city
overall; in four (East Boston, Hyde Park,
Charlestown, Central) the prices increased
but less than the city overall; and in three
(Mattapan, Roxbury, Dorchester), the prices
decreased in nominal terms (Department
of Neighborhood Development, City of
Boston 2011). As it will be presented later,
Mattapan and Roxbury are also the city's
neighborhoods with the lowest household
median-income levels. Back Bay/Beacon
Hill, the city's neighborhood with the highest
median household income levels, presents
the steepest increase (over 47.5%).
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Unsurprisingly, market-rate housing
sales prices have clear and strong spatial
associations with the city's urban landscape.
Specifically, a City of Boston report on real
estate trends conducted between July and
December of 2008 reveals that all of the
city's neighborhoods other than East Boston,
Mattapan, Roxbury, and Dorchester have
less than 25% of their market-rate housing
stock available to a home buyer with an
income of $70,000 (City of Boston 2009,
10). The most recent foreclosure trouble has
also affected housing prices and, therefore,
affordability levels within the city.
However, foreclosure patterns have also
strong geographic ties. In 2008, Dorchester,
Roxbury, Mattapan, East Boston and Hyde
Park contained more than 83% of all
foreclosures in Boston (City of Boston 2009,
14). Hence, their occurrence has not altered
the geographic patterns of the lowest and
highest priced housing.
Due to the foreclosures, in 2005 a city
resident with an annual income of $70,000
FIGURE 5: 2008 SHARES OF AFFORDABLE MARKET RATE HOUSING PER NEIGHBORHOOD
Percent of Market Rate Housing
Affordable to a Buyer with an Income
of $70,000 (July-December) 2008
Legend
Unaffordable (<25%)
Moderately Affordable (25-50%)
Highly Affordable (50-75%)
Extremely Affordable (>75%)
City of Boston, Leading the Way Il/ Report, 2009
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could afford to buy the bottom 7.8% of market housing in the
city, while in 2009 that same buyer could access the bottom 25%
of market housing. Similarly, a buyer with an annual income of
$80,000 could afford to buy only the bottom 12% of housing in
2005, while in 2009 the same buyer could access the bottom
33% of market-rate housing (City of Boston 2009, 9). Figure
5 illustrates the different shares of market rate housing prices
accessible to a buyer with an annual income of $70,000 based
on the market rate prices from July to December 2008. Only
two neighborhoods, Mattapan and East Boston, are considered
highly affordable with 50-75% of the market-rate housing stock
accessible to a resident with an annual income of $70,000. Two
more neighborhoods, Dorchester and Roxbury, are considered
moderately affordable with 25-50% of their market-rate housing
accessible to the same buyer, while the rest of the neighborhoods
are unaffordable with less than 25% of market-rate housing
affordable to that same buyer.
Boston's Land Values and Ownership
Land values greatly impact the per unit cost of a housing
development. In this way, they restrict the possibility of
providing affordable units. Moreover, affordable housing is often
constructed on city owned land. Hence, the spatial patterns
of both land values and available city-owned land define the
possibilities for creating affordable housing. Figure 6 illustrates
the spatial pattern of land values per square foot in the city,
based on the 2008 data maintained in the city's assessor's office.
The lighter gradient portrays lower per square foot land values
and the darker gradient higher ones. Figure 6 clearly shows the
concentration of significantly higher land values in the downtown
and its adjacent areas. The lowest land values are concentrated
in Mattapan, Roxbury, and parts of East Boston, South Boston,
and Charlestown. The presence of lower land values in parts of
Hyde Park is the result of industrial hubs.
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FIGURE 6: 2008 AsSESSED LAND VALUE PER SQUARE FOOT
-' Land Values of
j Over$100/SF
Land Values of
Less than $20/ SF
(includes city owned land)
West Roxbury
I
$160.01 - $734.59
$100.01 - $160.00$50.01 -$100.00
$20.01 - $50.00
$0.00 - $20.00
MIT Geodata Repository, Originator: City of Boston Assessing Department, Data from 2008
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FIGURE 7: 2008 CITY OF BOSTON UNDEVELOPED CITY-OWNED LAND Exhibit 7 reveals the concentrations of
undeveloped city-owned land in the city
based on 2008 data, available from the
City's assessing department. Evident are
the high concentrations of undeveloped city
owned land in Roxbury and Mattapan as well
as parts of East Boston and Charlestown.
The geographic patterns of this analysis,
along with the per square foot land value
patterns presented earlier, reveal a real
limitation in introducing affordable housing
in parts of the city. This limitation makes
density considerations and building height
limitations an important mitigating strategy
for consideration.
MIT Geodata Repository, Originator: City of Boston
Assessing Department, Data from 2008
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Geographic Distribution of Housing
Affordability
Boston's current five-year Consolidated
Plan covers city goals and strategies for the
period from July 1, 2008, to June 30, 2013.
It also reports the geographic distribution of
affordable housing by neighborhood based
on the 2000 Census count of year-round,
occupied housing units and the 2001
Chapter 40B of the state of Massachusetts
affordable housing data. Table 2 provides the
number of existing subsidized housing units
in each neighborhood based on the 2001
40B list, the year-round occupied housing
units in each neighborhood based on the
2000 Census and the resulting percent of
affordable units per neighborhood.
The geographic distribution of
subsidized affordable housing in the city
evidently has geographic associations. As
clearly observed, Roxbury and the South
End have the highest number of affordable
housing units in the city, with a combined
total equaling 32% of the City's affordable
TABLE 2: 2000 CITY OF BOSTON, GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING
NEIGHBORHOOD AFFORDABLE OCCUPIED PERCENT NUMBER OFUNITS HOUSING UNITS OF UNITS PROJECTS
AlltnBiho 3,5008724%3
FenwayKenmI 285 1,81 1.28% I 26
Hyde Park 83 1190 6,99% 10
I Back Bay/Beacon Hill
I Charlestown
I Roslindale
Ce a 2 9 1,1
Sot En 6,2 1524 4159 86
West Roxbury
Total
1,349
47,244
12,364 10.91% 8
250,368 18.87% 658
City of Boston 5-year Consolidated Plan 2008-2013,
Highlighted in dark grey are neighborhoods with CDCs
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housing stock. The high concentration in both neighborhoods
is due to a mixture of large public housing, Section 8 Project-
Based, and nonprofit-sponsored developments (City of Boston
and Department of Neighborhood Development 2008, 43).
Neighborhoods such as Back Bay/Beacon Hill, Hyde Park,
and West Roxbury contain few public housing units and fewer
developments led by non-profit development organizations (City
of Boston and Department of Neighborhood Development 2008,
43).
Highlighted in table 2 are also the neighborhoods with active
Community Development Corporations (CDCs). The presence
and role of CDCs in the development of affordable housing in the
areas of their influence has been significant. The city of Boston
estimates that, between 2004 and 2007, when the second phase
of the city's comprehensive housing strategy (launched in 2000
and widely known as Leading the Way) was complete, CDCs
in Boston were the largest single developer of affordable units,
responsible for 34% of the total affordable housing created in the
city (City of Boston and Menino 2008, 11-12). The South End,
although it does not have a formal CDC, is also highlighted. The
South End's strong community advocacy and the leadership of
Mel King (political activist, community advocate, and Democratic
state representative) in the area resulted in the well-known Tent
City mixed-income development (a result attributable to strong
community unrest and opposition that started in late 1960s), and
have been closely associated with affordable housing creation
(Kennedy 1994, 201). Both the case of CDCs and the South
End community activism are evidence that affordable housing
creation is strongly associated with a community's capacity
to demand it. Additionally, many new affordable housing
developments, especially in Roxbury and Dorchester, are also
the result of the availability of city owned and/or affordable
land and buildings. This fact reveals the significance of land
prices in the creation of affordable housing (City of Boston and
Department of Neighborhood Development 2008, 43).
To explore a hypothetical scenario in which affordable housing
is spatially distributed equally across the city's neighborhoods,
I use as a baseline the information provided above to estimate
the number of affordable units that should have been provided in
each neighborhood. Table 3 presents the results of that scenario
and indicates the number of affordable housing units that need
to be added or subtracted from each neighborhood's subsidized
affordable housing base in order to create the same level of
housing affordability (18.87%) in each neighborhood.
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SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF
AFFORDABLE HOUSING
AFFORDABLE YEAR AFFORDABLE
NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING UNITS ROUND HOUSING TOFOR EQUAL HOUSING BE ADDED OR
DISTRIBUTION UNITS SUBTRACTED
Allston/Brighton 5,830 30,897 1,976
Back Bay/Beacon Hill 3,211 17,018 2,263
Central 2,676 14,180 207
Charlestown 1,455 7,709 (725)
Dorchester 6,223 32,977 1,849
East Boston 2,842 15,060 448
Fenway/Kenmore 2,544 13,481 489
Hyde Park 2,246 11,902 1,414
Jamaica Plain 3,028 16,045 (1,090)
Mattapan 2,468 13,079 370
Roslindale 2,493 13,213 639
Roxbury 4,198 22,247 (5,062)
South Boston 2,829 14,992 (306)
South End 2,869 15,204 (3,455)
West Roxbury 2,333 12,364 984
TABLE 3: SCENARIO-EQUAL
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Although this scenario lacks the real obstacles that actual
development constraints present-land availability, land and
property values, community desire or opposition, market
development trends, and others-it illustrates the neighborhoods
that present the greatest shortage and the greatest supply of
affordable housing in Boston. This study provides another way
of assessing the magnitude of the effort needed if equal spatial
distribution of housing affordability is to be achieved. Such
an exploratory analysis can be used as a reference (as new
affordable housing developments are proposed) to evaluate
whether the additional affordable units would contribute toward
a more mixed-income environment or if they would further
support spatial income segregation in the city. Figure 8 illustrates
the existing geographic distribution of subsidized, affordable
housing in the city and highlights the necessary supply of
affordable units for developing the equal distribution scenario.
FIGURE 7: SCENARIO - EQUAL SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING
Legend +1,976L
Affordable Units
to be Added
Affordable Units
to be Subtracted
-1,090
+984
t+639
Percent of Subsidized Housing Per
Neighborhood in 2000
5.57% -6.69%
7.00% - 14.00%
14.01% - 20.00%
20.01% - 30.00%
30.01% - 41.62%
City of Boston 5-year Consolidated Plan 2008-2013
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More importantly, this scenario does not assume that the
overall number of units provided is enough to satisfy all of the
city's affordable housing needs. Boston's 2000 Comprehensive
Housing Affordability Strategy (CHAS) Data reveal that 38.2% of
all city's rental households were facing a cost burden by spending
over 30% of their income towards gross rent needs. An additional
19.2% of rental households were facing a severe cost burden by
spending over 50% of their income on gross rent needs. As the
primary focus of this study is the spatial distribution of affordable
housing in the city and addressing the issue of adequate supply
would require a different methodological approach, this study
merely acknowledges that the existing affordable units are not
enough to satisfy all of the city's needs.
2. 3 STRATEGIES FOR AFFORDABLE HOUSING
CREATION IN BOSTON
As a response to Boston's housing shortage and escalating
affordable housing crisis, in 2000 the city launched a
comprehensive housing strategy called "Leading the Way"
(LTW). The strategy required the collaboration of all the three
city agencies involved in housing creation and affordability
issues: the Boston Housing Authority (BHA), the Department
of Neighborhood Development (DND), and the Boston
Redevelopment Authority (BRA). The Leading the Way strategy
outlined goals and strategies for the creation of market-rate
housing and the production and preservation of affordable
housing. The same time that Boston launched the first phase of
Leading the Way (LTW 1), Mayor Menino (through an executive
order) enabled the city to also establish the Inclusionary Policy,
widely also known as Inclusionary Development Policy (IDP).
IDP relies on the use of private funds to provide affordable
housing for a part of the population with income levels not
serviced through other housing subsidy programs (Geoffrey
Lewis, personal interview, February 2011). IDP is analyzed in
more detail in chapter 3.
Part of the key strategies outlined in the first phase of LTW
(FY2001-FY2003) were: (a) greater contribution of city funds to
affordable housing creation resulting from the sale of city assets;
(b) greater emphasis on leveraging city funds with other public
and private development financing, (c) establishing inclusionary
zoning, and (d) making available one thousand city-owned
parcels for housing developments (City of Boston and Menino
2003). A main goal of the second phase of LTW (LTW 1l) was
to produce 10,000 new units of housing, 2,100 of which would
be below-market rates, to respond to the unbalanced supply
and demand needs in the city. At that time, Mayor Menino
also suggested increasing the city's inclusionary development
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requirement to 15% of the market-rate units for affordable
housing compared to the previous 10% requirement and an
increase in the cash-out option included in the policy. LTW 11
also called for more downtown housing development through
a new incentive zoning that permits taller residential buildings
in the downtown core. It also supported higher-density housing
around transit and commercial nodes, such as in the Fairmount
Line stations planned for Dorchester and in Roxbury's Jackson
Square, as well as in the neighborhood business districts (City of
Boston and Menino 2008). In March 2009 the city launched the
third phase of Leading the Way (LTW lll), which outlined the city's
housing priorities for the next three years. LTW Ill was formed
at the beginning of the current recession period, when market
conditions had softened and foreclosure problems had become
evident. Responding to the changing market forces, the four
main goals of LTW IlIl were to: (a) provide housing for the city's
workforce, (b) reverse the rise in homelessness, (c) address the
foreclosure crisis, and (d) preserve and stabilize the city's rental-
housing stock (City of Boston and Menino 2009).
Evident in all three phases of the Leading the Way is the city's
desire to utilize private funds, beyond state and federal sources.
Unsurprisingly, the strategies and goals of each phase respond
directly to the changing market conditions and, therefore, to the
city's ability to leverage additional private funds for creation of
affordable housing. Lastly, a key city strategy has become the
contribution of city-owned land to developers at a nominal fee for
affordable housing developments.
Although many of the resources utilized for the creation of
affordable housing are direct government subsidies, Boston
seeks to further its capacity to confront housing affordability
challenges through private development exactions. Specifically,
the uniqueness of Boston's linkage and inclusionary policies lies
not only in the fact that they are locally formed and administered
but also in that they have emerged to foster income integration in
the city through the production of affordable housing supported
by private investment. The next chapter discusses the formation
and application of both policies within Boston's unique political
and development climate.
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"[...] to build bridges between Boston's downtown community and the neighborhoods is
the result of a growing awareness of the interdependence of these sectors."
McCormack and Bolling, Report to the Mayor on the Linkage Between Downtown Development
and Neighborhood Housing (1983) pg 9.
URBAN DEVELOPMENT REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES IN BOSTON
3. 1 REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
Urban revitalization in Boston, as in many other US cities,
has been tainted by the heyday of the 1950s and 1960s urban
renewal era. This renewal, supported through federal programs
and funding sources, resulted in the brutal treatment and
displacement of a portion of the city's lower income and politically
disempowered population. Although by the 1970s such planning
practices had become extinct and had been removed from the
city's planning agenda, the emerging issues of speculative
downtown development and gentrification merely replaced the
methods through which the least wealthy of the city's population
may have been neglected and marginalized (Dreier and Ehrlich
1991, 358). Then again, the excess office development in
Boston's downtown in the 1980s resulted in considerable tax
revenues for the city, made a considerable contribution to the
city's fiscal health, and restored the local economy (Kennedy
1994, 222).
Because of the alluring fiscal benefits resulting from private
investment, municipalities-in an effort to create a pro-growth
environment-now offer an array of development-friendly
provisions, from direct subsidies to tax abatements to fee wavers
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and zoning relief measures. This popular approach relies on
the premise that the benefits of privately instigated economic
activities create overall community improvements and increase
economic activity. These programs are widely used by city-level
governments and constitute what are known as Type I policies
(Goetz 1990, 168). However, many studies have argued that
numerous, heavily publicly subsidized, private investments
have failed to clearly demonstrate the public benefit associated
with publicly supported projects and have also created social
inequality patterns (Goetz 1990, 186).
Urban development, land use, and city growth can significantly
impact issues of justice and equity (Alterman 1989, 3). Largely
due to the decentralized federalist system that characterizes
planning in the US, a significant amount of power and autonomy
over land use and development decisions exists at the local
level. Consequently, local-level programs and policies that aim
to deal with broad issues of equity and inequality at the city
level are not uncommon (Alterman 1989, 3-4). An example is
evident in the Type || polices, which require private developers
to provide public benefits in exchange for development rights.
Based on a completely different approach than the Type I
policies, Type || policies present a market-correction approach
that aims to mitigate negative development externalities and to
redistribute more equitably market-generated benefits through
local government's sophistication in leveraging their land use
authority (Goetz 1990, 171-172). However, Type || polices
assume a greater leverage of local governments over private
investment and are (or can be perceived as) possible only in
strong market places.
Two common examples of local-level Type || policies are the
inclusionary and the linkage policies. Discussed in more detailed
below, both policies are crafted and applied at the local level in
order to increase municipalities' capacity to provide affordable
housing. However, these two approaches are based on two
somewhat different concepts. Inclusionary zoning is based on
the goal of city-level social integration, while the linkage policy,
although adhering to the same concept, is mainly based on the
goal of sharing at the city level the responsibility for affordable
housing supply (Alterman 1989, 5). Although both policies are
a form of exaction, they differ from the conventional definition of
the term. The difference results from placing the financial burden
of typically affordable housing creation-rather than the cost of
public facilities or infrastructure projects construction (typically
associated with private development exactions)-on the private
market (Alterman 1989, 4). The next section frames Boston's
urban development politics that made these policies possible.
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3. 2 BOSTON'S URBAN DEVELOPMENT POLITICS
Boston's local government is characterized by a strong mayoral
system and overwhelming representation by the Democratic
Party. Mayor Menino, the city's current mayor, has been in place
for over seventeen years. In 2000, under his tenure the city
established the inclusionary zoning policy as an executive order.
Mayor Flynn (1984-1993) preceded him and governed for three
terms following Mayor White (1968-1984). The linkage policy
was formed and embedded in the city's zoning ordinance, at the
beginning of White's term.
In 1960, the City Planning Board was abolished, and the
Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) assumed its powers.
BRA's development authority includes "the power to buy and
sell property, the power to acquire property through eminent
domain, and the power to grant tax concession, and to
encourage commercial and residential development." (Boston
Redevelopment Authority HTTP). Housed in City Hall, BRA's
municipal planning and development authority, on both housing
and commercial development, have always been closely
affiliated with mayoral and City Hall politics.
Mayor Flynn won the mayoral election after defeating Mel King,
with whom he shared similar concerns regarding neighborhood
disinvestment, housing affordability, and economic assistance
for the poor (Kennedy 1994, 218). During Flynn's first term,
Boston was facing unprecedented economic boom, mostly
due to the outcome of Mayor White's last-term legacy as
"downtown mayor," characterized by his concerted support of
downtown development. Downtown development, however, did
not translate to economic benefits for all of the city's residents
(Kennedy 1994, 219). Conversely, Flynn ran his campaign on
the promise of economic justice, and he became known for
challenging traditional growth-machine politics (Dreier and
Keating 1990, 194).
Unlike Mayor White, who kept most of the city's urban
development within his authority, Mayor Flynn appointed
Stephen Coyle as the director of the BRA. Flynn appreciated
Coyle's understanding of the fine balance between urban
development market forces and social benefits, as well as his
ability to balance downtown development with the economics of
jobs, housing issues, and the city's resulting affluence (Kennedy
1994, 222-223). In 1984, shortly after Mayor Flynn's election, the
city adopted the linkage policy, which had won the City Council
approval prior to Flynn's election but had been vetoed by Mayor
White (Kennedy 1994, 229). At the time, in addition to the private
development fee exaction stipulated in the linkage policy,
Coyle formed a parcel-to-parcel requirement for two particular
development projects. The private developers of valuable city-
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owned, downtown property were required to also develop an
additional site on one of the city's ignored areas (Kennedy 1994,
229).
Coyle recognized Boston's unique and strong economic
environment and based strategies on the grounds of "market
orientation" solutions. The imposed exactions were inflicting an
additional two percent increase on the overall development cost,
while at the same time investors in Boston were receiving a higher
return on their investments than in other comparable market
places (Kennedy 1994, 230). Coyle's ability to implement such a
delicate market balance reveals not only the city government's
capacity to grasp real estate economic trends in depth but also
its ability to recognize the market cycles and implement policies
that serve the "public interest" without discouraging private
investment.
Regional economic conditions had worsened during Mayor
Flynn's second term. The linkage policy, however, remained in
place as part of the zoning ordinance. Recognizing the different
negotiation power that city government in the late 1980s had over
the development community, the emphasis shifted to directing
public resources toward capital improvement projects-not only
to preserve the city's downtown and neighborhoods but also to
offer construction jobs (Kennedy 1994, 235). Such a shift in the
city's urban development attitude illustrates a clear relationship
between public leverage and market forces. Although it
demonstrates the limitations that redistribution on the local
level has to overcome, it articulates the tendency of city level
undertakings to be flexible when market forces mandate it and
assertive when market conditions allow it. Such a system can
have lasting rewards, as is evident by the linkage policy still in
place today.
During Mayor Menino's third term, Boston initiated the
inclusionary policy. At a time when the national economy was
coming out of the late 1990s recession, Boston was experiencing
strong market trends, downtown development, and rapid labor
force growth. The implications of such strong economic trends
were impacting housing affordability in the city and led to the
creation of the comprehensive affordable housing strategy
"Leading the Way" (LTW). In 2000, during the first phase of LTW,
inclusionary zoning mandated that private developers include
affordable units within market-rate developments. However,
the inclusionary policy still exists solely as an executive order.
Although the recent recession did not provide sufficient reason
to abolish such a policy, the city also did not capitalize on
the national economic boom from 2005 to 2008 to bestow a
permanent status on the inclusionary policy. Therefore, whether
the policy will remain in place in perpetuity remains to be seen.
The next sections tell the story of linkage and inclusionary
policies in general and the specifics of their realization in Boston.
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3. 3 DISCUSSIONS ON LINKAGE PROGRAMS
Linkage policies require fee payments from commercial
developments. Such policies intend to link downtown commercial
development benefits with affordable housing, employment,
and transportation benefits within a city (Keating 1986, 133).
Although the specifics of the policies vary greatly among
different municipalities, linkage fees are generally established
to mitigate the rising housing prices caused by economic
and job growth. Often linkage policies require either the direct
creation of affordable housing or the contribution of fees to a
trust fund that would then allocate resources to the production of
affordable housing. However, these policies are not widespread
among US cities. The first examples were observed in Boston,
San Francisco, and Santa Monica in the early 1980s (Keating
1986, 133). Since linkage policies are intended to redistribute
resources at the local level through private investment exactions
(Type || policy), they are considered possible only in strong
local markets. In addition, the municipal-level formation and
administration of such policies suggest a wide variety of program
goals and conditions (Alterman 1989, 25).
When linkage policies were first formed, their legal legitimacy
was questioned in court (Connors and Massachusetts at
Amherst University 1987, 69). Municipalities have overcome
the legal hurdle by including in the linkage policies an explicit
argument of how commercial development adversely impacts
the housing market. Furthermore, the fee-payment formula needs
to sufficiently and fairly base a payment on each development's
impact. As long as the required payment is proportionate to the
costs inflicted on the municipality because of a development,
the payment to mitigate the associated socioeconomic costs is
deemed fair (Connors and Massachusetts at Amherst University
1987, 69).
A study of linkage policies in the first three cities that
implemented them revealed the following conditions for their
formation: a strong downtown private investment, community
advocacy and unrest over the social costs that downtown
development produces, the absence of mechanisms to generate
additional tax revenue, the creation of new downtown and land
use plans, and most importantly, progressive local governments
(Keating 1986, 134). The importance of strong and progressive
political support is evident by the absence of linkage policies
from municipalities in the Sunbelt region (Keating 1986, 134).
As illustrated earlier, Boston met these conditions during Mayor
Flynn's first term.
However, speculation over the social implications of the
policy questions the goals and administration of trust funds. As
the anticipated objective of trust funds is to maximize the funds'
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leverage to produce the most units, it is possible that affordability
targets are compromised and that NHT funds are not directed
toward low- or very low- income households (Alterman 1989,
54-55). In addition, because of the conversion of payments
from commercial land uses to residential land uses through
the institution of trust funds, the decision as to the affordability
targets is affected by political will and the leverage of a city's
lower income population (Alterman 1989, 55). Furthermore,
since linkage policies direct funds from one type of land use
to another, even under the direct affordable housing creation
option, it is likely that the housing created will be located in less-
desirable areas of a city and will not promote social or income
integration (Alterman 1989, 56).
The greatest strength of linkage programs is probably the
intention to mitigate the social costs created through commercial
urban (downtown) development by placing the burden on the
private development. Evidently, the implementation of the
programs depends on local market conditions. The conversion
of commercial development exactions to residential benefits
addresses the complexity of social cost resulting from urban
development. However, the non-spatial emphasis of the fund
allocations can create spatial inequality and may undermine
the social goals of the policy unless additional strategies or
provisions with the linkage policy suggest otherwise.
3. 4 BOSTON's LINKAGE POLICY
Linkage Policy Overview
In the early 1980s, Boston, like many other cities, was hard
pressed to fill the affordable housing creation gap that resulted
from the cuts in government assistance and federal resources
that characterized the Reagan Era. Although state-level
initiatives and programs assumed a greater responsibility for
social services, state-level resources were not enough to satisfy
Boston's needs (McCormack and Bolling 1983, 7). However,
throughout the early 1980s housing and urban development
were not the main focus of neighborhood groups. At the time,
neighborhood groups opposed rent control and subsidized
housing because they thought these measures would contribute
to neighborhood decline and housing abandonment. The real
estate and development boom that followed made housing
issues prominent on the community's agenda (Dreier and
Keating 1990, 198).
As a result, city-level intervention became key. Boston's
community groups, social advocates, and a progressive local
political environment became increasingly concerned and vocal
over the uneven economic development created by purely
market-driven urban development, which was concentrated
54 INVESTING (IN) EQUITY
mainly in the downtown. Boston's housing linkage policy
became the center of Flynn's mayoral campaign. Although it
was recognized that such a policy alone would not be enough
to solve Boston's housing affordability issues, the policy grew to
be a symbolic strategy in addressing the economic disparity and
uneven geography of opportunity created through downtown
urban development and the end of urban renewal funding (Dreier
and Ehrlich 1991, 356-362).
At the end of his last mayoral term, Mayor White (who preceded
Mayor Flynn) convened an advisory group to study city-level
redistributive strategies and the potential establishment of a
linkage policy. The group's deliberations included whether to
allocate general funds for housing or dedicate a percentage of the
increase in taxes generated by new development to affordable
housing. However, Massachusetts established Proposition 2 ,
which went into effect in 1982 and required that the total property
tax amount be no more than 2.5 % of the fair market value of the
tax base. In order to achieve that proportion, the tax rates had
to be reduced by 15% a year until achieving the 2.5% target.
Thereafter, taxes could not be increased more than 2.5% annually.
As a result, in FY 1981 Boston raised 518 million dollars in taxes
(4% effective rate) and in 1983, after the tax cuts, it raised 144
million, presenting an additional difficulty for the city, which was
facing a great challenge in maintaining the pre-existing levels of
services with declining tax revenues (McCormack and Bolling
1983, 7). Therefore, as there was no excess of property taxes
from new, commercial, real estate developments, linkage fees
presented a "hidden tax" mechanism without formally requiring
additional taxation.
From these early days of the policy's initiation, linkage became
"part of an effort to build bridges between Boston's downtown
community and the neighborhoods and it is the result of a
growing awareness of the interdependence of these sectors."
(McCormack and Bolling 1983, 9) In the early 1980s, the
advisory group debated whether linkage fees should be applied
to market-rate housing, too, with conflicting opinions. The main
concern was that the city was experiencing great commercial
development trends in the downtown with polarizing income
disparity in the population. Specifically, between 1970 and 1980
the city's lower-income and upper-income population grew, while
the middle-income population declined (McCormack and Bolling
1983, 6). Subsequently, in 1980, almost 40% of Boston's renters
were paying rent in excess of 30% of their income (McCormack
and Bolling 1983, 6). Under these considerations, the advisory
group suggested directing funds from commercial developments
for the creation of moderate and low median income households,
which would also promote the creation of mixed-income housing
opportunities (McCormack and Bolling 1983, 26).
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The linkage policy's two main goals, as outlined in the City's
1986 Article 26 of the zoning code, were i) to regulate direct
or indirect negative impacts of large real estate projects that
cause the displacement of low or moderate income residents
from housing, or that contribute to the escalating housing prices
and ii) to increase the availability of low and moderate income
housing in the city (City of Boston 1986, 1). Stipulations included
in the 1986 zoning regulation had well-defined spatial terms
regarding the allocation of the collected funds. Specifically, the
regulation required that 10% of the collected funds be spent in
developments located in the area highlighted in figure 8 and
an additional 20% in neighborhood developments in the rest
of the city located around or adjacent to the real-estate project
from which they were exacted. All affordable housing was
targeting households with annual income at or below 80% of the
metropolitan area median income (City of Boston 1986, 3). In
addition, linkage fees from real estate developments within the
highlighted area (figure 8) were required in seven equal annual
installments, with the first one due upon building permit issuance.
Linkage fee payments from real estate developments elsewhere
in the city were required in twelve equal annual installments, with
the first one due upon the certificate of occupancy or twenty-four
months after granting the building permit, whichever occurred
first (City of Boston 1986, 2-4).
FIGURE 8: 1986 NHT FUND ALLOCATIONS
An additional 20% of any housing
contribution should be spent for
affordable housing in an area adjacent
to the commercial development
1986 City of Boston Article 26 A, Zoning Commission
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These different fee payment timeframes demonstrate that
real estate market forces have geographic ties. The spatial
emphasis in the allocation of the funds reveals an attempt not
only to create affordable housing in the city but also to do so in
the areas where most development occurred. As revealed in the
Planning the City Upon a Hill (1994), which discusses Boston's
urban development politics and history, it is likely that the spatial
emphasis is the outcome of social advocacy and community
unrest. Such advocacy led to the formation of the policy and
demanded an end to urban development's social costs, which
created geographic exclusion of lower income residents from
the rapidly developing areas of the city.
In 1996, the linkage was further incorporated into Article 80B-
7 Development Impact Project Exactions, which covers large-
project review standards in the city's zoning code. Although the
policy's specifics have periodically changed, its fundamentals
remain the same. Linkage requires a per square foot of private
development fee exaction applied to all new, large-scale,
commercial real estate developments of over 100,000 square
feet requiring zoning relief and to commercial projects (including
retail, hotel and institutional uses) seeking expansion or
rehabilitation resulting in a final project size of over 100,000
square feet. The largest portion of the funds collected-$7.87
per square foot of development in excess of 100,000 square
feet-are provided through a competitive Request for Proposals
(RFP) process as a capital grant to help pay for the cost of
creating new affordable units or renovating and preserving the
existing affordable housing stock. A smaller portion-$1.57 per
square foot of development in excess of 100,000 square feet-is
used to connect Boston's residents with adult education, English
as a Second Language, and job training services (City of Boston
1996, 51). Although there are still different payment timeframes
based on the commercial property's location, the current RFP
does not include explicit geographic boundaries regarding
where funds for affordable housing creation should be allocated.
The Neighborhood Housing Trust (NHT), administered
through the City's Department of Neighborhood Development
(DND), was created in 1986 to manage the housing linkage
funds. Because linkage fees do not have to be paid up front, the
different timeframe terms are still in place today, but the specifics
of the stipulations have changed. For developments included in
the area defined as "downtown," linkage payments are made
over seven years, starting with the building permit issuance. For
developments included in the area defined as "neighborhood,"
linkage payments are made over seven years, starting either two
years after the building permit issuance, or upon the occupancy
permit issuance, whichever occurs first (Figure 9). In either case,
the developers may choose to create or assist in the creation of
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low- and moderate-income housing in the city, in lieu of paying
the housing linkage fee. A pre-condition for this alternative is
that the cost of the housing creation option is equivalent to
the housing linkage fee for which it substitutes. Until 2007,
the NHT had directed $81,458,485 in funds to the creation
or preservation of 6,159 affordable units included in 115
development projects throughout the city (City of Boston and
Menino 2005, 3).
The purposes of the housing linkage program as outlined
today in article 80B-7 of the city's zoning code are "to prevent
overcrowding and deterioration of existing housing; to preserve
and increase the City's housing amenities; to facilitate the
adequate provision of low and moderate income housing; and
to establish a balance between new, large-scale, real estate
development projects and the low and moderate income
housing needs. The housing exaction requirement is designed
to mitigate the impacts of large-scale real estate development
on the available supply of low and moderate income housing
and to increase the availability of such housing by requiring
developers to make a development impact payment to the
NHT or to contribute to the creation of low and moderate
income housing." (City of Boston 1996, 51)
FIGURE 9: LINKAGE PAYMENTS
Payments over 7 years
starting with the building
permit issuance
Payments over 7 years,
starting either 2 years
after the building
permit issuance, or at
the occupancy permit
issuance, whichever
occurs first
Linkage Payments:
$9.44 per square foot of development in
excess of 100,000 square feet
$7.87 Affordable Housing (NHT)
$1.57 Adult education and job training (JHT)
1996 City of Boston Article 80 Development Review and Approval
58 INVESTING (IN) EQUITY
---------------- -
2002
Houin $.18
(3.8 inrese
FIGURE 10: LINKAGE PAYMENTS TIMELINE
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Linkage Contribution: Obligation on large-scale commercial (includes retail, hotel and institutional) real estate
developments that require zoning approval. Fee based on fixed dollar amount per square foot of gross floor area
in excess of 100,000 square foot. If the developer elects, the entire amount due may be present valued and paid
in one year.
Boston Municipal Research Bureau 2007
A study conducted in 2000 by the Boston Redevelopment
Authority (BRA) compares Boston's linkage policy outcomes
with those of other cities in the US. The study ranked Boston's
policy the best in the country. The results are based on two
indicators: the amount of funds harvested and the ability to
maintain economic growth and development (City of Boston
and BRA 2000, 7). Boston's success in collecting the largest
amount of funds was attributed to higher fees than most cities,
full-city coverage, broad coverage of development types, and
the flexibility to reduce disincentives of development (City of
Boston and BRA 2000, 4). This study reveals that the basis of
success and effectiveness is the amount of the funds collected.
Contingent on economic trends as observed through indicators
of development activity (such as prevailing per-square-foot
commercial rents, employment growth, inflation rates, affordable
housing vacancy rates, and new housing construction trends),
the city can use its discretion to increase the linkage fees (City of
Boston 1986, 4). In April 2006, in the middle of the most recent
economic boom and at the request of Mayor Menino, the BRA
and the Boston Zoning Commission increased linkage fees for
the fourth time since the program's initiation (figure 10). The fee
adjustment to mitigate the rising housing construction costs and
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prices in the city occurred after observations revealed a strong
and growing commercial real estate market, which could bear
the increase of the linkage fees (Boston Municipal Research
Bureau 2007).
By imposing an additional fee burden on developers,
implementing linkage policies could discourage private
development and push potential projects in areas outside the
municipality's boundaries. However, such a trend has not been
observed in Boston, due mostly to the unique urban environment
offerings and market forces that characterize the city (Theresa
Gallagher, personal interview, February201 1). Moreover, because
private developers are able to direct linkage funds to specific
affordable housing developments, in some cases developers
use this avenue to create positive community relationships and
enhance their image in an area where they may have other
development projects awaiting community approval (Theresa
Gallagher, personal interview, February 2011). Therefore, in the
case of Boston, the linkage program has occasionally created
a win-win situation between private development and public
benefits (Theresa Gallagher, personal interview, February 2011).
Linkage Policy Outcomes
Thestrength of the linkage policyis rooted in itsabilityto generate
funds from commercial private developments to supplement the
city's capacity to create affordable housing and job training. As
the creation of affordable housing and the implementation of job
training efforts are two separate and not programmatically linked
initiatives, administered through separate city departments, this
analysis evaluates only the affordable housing component of
the linkage program. The private exactions nature of the policy
accounts for a cyclical availability of NHT funds. Figure 11 shows
NHT fund contributions toward affordable housing units in the
city from 1985 to 2005 (last year when available information was
provided by DND) in nominal terms.
Although the varied allocation of NHT funds through time is
not surprising, a more important issue is the timing of its cyclical
characteristics. When market conditions and private investment
slow down, affordability needs increase because recession
periods usually mean that more households earn less income.
However, the seven-year timeframe established for exacting the
linkage funds from private developments tends to mitigate this
issue (Theresa Gallagher, personal interview, February 2011).
Evident in figure 11 is that the availability of NHT funds lags
over market cycles. This lag may also be due to the two-year
time period that occurs between granting permit or occupancy
to the commercial development and the initiation of the seven-
year payment period in the case of commercial developments
located outside the downtown area. This policy provision seems
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FIGURE 11: 1986-2005 NHT FUNDS ALLOCATED FOR
AFFORDABLE HOUSING
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Department of Neighborhood Development,
Neighborhood Housing Trust 2005 Report
to have also contributed to mitigating the impact of NHT funds
availability over the periods when such funds may be most in
need.
At the end of FY 2003 the City reported the outcomes of LTW
I. Between FY2001- FY2003 $748,526,707 was invested for the
creation of affordable housing in the city. Of that, approximately
71% was private and 29% public investments. NHT funds
contributed $15,640,749 out of the total amount of $217,891,957
of public investment for affordable housing creation at that time
(City of Boston and Menino 2003, 12). A summary of the funding
sources contributed to new affordable housing in the city during
the first phase of LTW is presented in figure 12.
FIGURE 12: FY 2001 -FY 2003 ALLOCATED AFFORDABLE
HOUSING FUNDS IN BOSTON
Other Public Leading the Way Linkage/NHT; 2.1%
Funds; 2.6% , Fund; 3.3% HOME/CDBG;
3.3%
Other City; 0.6%
State Sources;
8.0%
Private Sources;
70.8%
Federal Sources;
9.4%
Adopted from the October 2003 LTW / Completion Report
At the beginning of 2008, the City reported the outcomes of
LTW 1l. Between FY2004-FY2007 $507,754,262 was invested
in the creation of affordable housing in the city. Of that, 59%
were public resources and 41 % private investment. Of the total
amount of public subsidies ($299,447,459), 29.8% were federal,
18.3% were state, and 10.9% were city resources. NHT funds
accounted for 22.3% of the city's contributions and for 2.4%
of the overall resources invested (City of Boston and Menino
2008, 14). The three-year period of LTW || follows the recession
observed during the early 2000s and includes a period of fast
and rigorous economic growth for the city and the nation. As
presented earlier, at that time Boston gained a total of 28,836 jobs.
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FIGURE 13: FY 2004-FY 2007 ALLOCATED AFFORDABLE
HOUSING FUNDS IN BOSTON
Entitlement Grants to Leading the Way Inclusionary
Boston; 4.9% Fund; 2.2% Development Fund;
0.8% Linkage/NHT; 2.4%
Other City; 0.4%
Private Sources;
41.0%
Adopted from the January 2008 LTW // Completion Report
Yet a greater portion of overall public subsidies, as compared to
private investment, was allocated for the creation of affordable
housing (figure 13). This can be partially explained because
strategies for LTW 11 were formed in 2003 in the environment of
the earlier recession period. However, the percent contribution
of NHT funds between 2004 and 2007 is similar to the earlier
three-year period, while overall there is an indication of different
relationship between private development leverage over public
resources. Figure 13 illustrates the funding sources contributed
to new affordable housing in the city during LTW ll.
3. 5 DISCUSSIONS OF INCLUSIONARY ZONING
Inclusionary zoning policies first emerged in some US states
in the early 1970s, as a result of the Reagan Era's federal aid
cuts to affordable housing. Such policies called to set aside a
small portion of the units in residential developments (typically
between 10 and 20 percent) for households unable to bear
market-rate housing prices (Calavita and Mallach 2008, 15).
Furthermore, at the time inclusionary housing was seen as a tool
to foster racially and socioeconomically integrated communities.
Massachusetts, California and New Jersey were the first states
to enact inclusionary zoning state laws. During these early
years, inclusionary zoning was aimed at supporting affordability
and mixed-income environments in the suburbs (Calavita and
Mallach 2008a, 16). Most recently, it has been adopted on the
local scale, resulting in its inclusion in the zoning ordinance of
over three hundred jurisdictions-cities, towns, and counties
(Furman Center for Housing Policy 2008, 1). The objective to
deconcentrate poverty through the integration of affordable units
within market-rate projects also intends to provide economically
disadvantaged residents with better access to employment
(Read and The Center of Real Estate at UNC Charlotte 2008, 6).
The affordable units included in a market-rate development
require the same per unit construction cost but, through lower
rents or sales prices, generate less profit. Therefore, inclusionary
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policies impose an additional cost on private developers. There
is a great deal of controversy over who finally bears this additional
cost. For the most part, the literature supports the idea that the
additional cost leads to the repression of land values: although
developers may be willing to decrease their profit margin,
whenever possible they will negotiate for a lower land cost
(Calavita and Mallach 2008, 17). As such, inclusionary zoning
provisions are often married with cost offsets or incentives (such
as density bonuses, fast-track permitting, wavers or deferral of
impact fees, tax-exempt bond mortgage finance, CDBG funds).
However, these strategies often suggest that the cost burden is
either directly (in the case of CDBG funds) or indirectly inflicted
back upon the public sector (Calavita and Mallach 2008, 19).
Moreover, the coupling of incentives with the inclusionary
policies in order to address the cost burden depends heavily
on the specific market conditions of each locality and the
leverage that each public sector has over private investors.
Table 4 provides a summary of economic incentives often
incorporated with inclusionary stipulations and their advantages
and disadvantages for the public sector.
As inclusionary stipulations share the Type || policy
characteristics, they are more likely to be adopted by jurisdictions
that are more affluent and near other jurisdictions having similar
provisions, which also have growth management and cluster
TABLE 5: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR
PUBLIC SECTOR PUBLIC SECTOR
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
- Minimal direct cost - Less valuable in
- Increase in housing weak markets
DENSITY supply 
- IncreasesBONUSES - Encourages demand for public
developnent infrastructure
- Minimal direct cost
- Reduces private 
- Limited value inEXPEDITED sector markets with fewPERMITTING risks regulatory barriers
- Increases housing
supply
- Reduces public
- Valuable in markets revenue
FEE WAVERS with exactions - Less valuable in
- Politically attractive m rke with
development fees
- May reduce
ALTERED - Minimal direct cost housing quality
DESIGN - Preferred by - Market forces
STANDARDS developers may require higher
design standards
- Efficient and easy to - High direct cost
CASH administer - Requires funding
SUBSIDIES - Preferred by sources
developers - Political opposition
Read and The Center of Real Estate at UNC Charlotte 2008
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zoning policies (Furman Center for Housing Policy 2008, 5-6).
However, even in strong markets, developers react to inclusionary
policy requirements by choosing to invest in other jurisdictions
that do not share the same laws, by raising the market-rate prices,
or by negotiating lower land prices (Furman Center for Housing
Policy 2008, 8). As increased supply of affordable housing and
potential for promoting income integrated environments are
not objectives of major public benefit, the question of how to
introduce inclusionary policies while mitigating the negative
externalities is of great importance. A 2008 Lincoln Institute study
on the value recapture of inclusionary housing suggests that
inclusionary polices are more effective when they become a part
of a comprehensive local land-use planning and development
processes that includes cost burden mitigation strategies, rather
than when they are merely superimposed on existing regulatory
frameworks. Therefore, incorporating inclusionary provisions
through rezoning to support intensification of land uses (upzoning
to higher densities or to more profitable land uses) can mitigate
their negative externalities (Calavita and Mallach 2008, 20).
In the case of Boston, in the absence of formal economic
incentives, the City's BRA negotiates with the private developers
on a case-by-case basis. However, because of the city's
restrictive zoning system, zoning exemptions and density
considerations become always part of the negotiations (Geoffrey
Lewis, personal interview, February 2011).
3. 6 BOSTON'S INCLUSIONARY POLICY (IDP)
Inclusionary Policy Overview
In 2000, in an effort to respond to the city's shortage of
affordable housing, Mayor Menino and the BRA initiated the city's
inclusionary zoning, also known as inclusionary development
policy (IDP). Although IDP had been discussed since the mid-
1980s, which is when the linkage policy surfaced, it was not
established as an executive order until February 26, 2000. The
main goal of the policy was to increase the city's capacity to
create affordable housing in Boston and to promote economic
integration within the city.
This first executive order's stipulation, which determined the
projects that should comply, is still the same today (2001). It
includes residential developments undertaken or financed by
a city agency, developed on city-owned property that propose
more than ten residential units, or include more than ten
residential units and requiring zoning relief. Residential projects
meeting any of these conditions were required to have 10%
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of units made affordable within the development, or a number
equal to no less than 0.15 times the total number of units created,
made affordable in a different off-site development. At the time,
at least 50% of the affordable units were targeted for moderate-
income households earning less than 80% of the metropolitan
area median income, and no more than 50% were targeted for
middle-income households earning between 80% and 120%
of the metropolitan median income. In lieu of directly creating
affordable housing, and with the city's approval, a monetary
contribution could be made toward the city's affordable housing
fund. In that case the monetary contribution was calculated by
multiplying 0.15 by the number of the new market-rate units, and
the estimated Affordable Housing Cost Factor, which in 2000
was $52,000 (City of Boston and Office of the Mayor Thomas M.
Menino 2000).
Researchers have suggested that, upon implementation,
Boston's IDP revealed some unintended or unforeseen
consequences and invited speculation regarding its
effectiveness. Specifically, due to the lack of distinction between
luxury and middle-class housing and between large and small
units, the program discouraged middle-class, market-rate
developments (Euchner and Pioneer Institute for Public Policy
Research.;Rappaport Institute for Greater Boston. 2003, 38). In
addition, since the IDP exempts developments smaller than ten
units, itcreatedadisincentivefor larger-scale-housing, multi-family
developments and, thereby, further proved that the city's lack of
housing contributed to even higher market-rate prices (Euchner
and Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research.;Rappaport
Institute for Greater Boston. 2003, 39). However, motivated
by the program's effectiveness in supplementing affordable
housing creation in the city, in September 2003 Mayor Menino,
in a letter to Mark Maloney, Chief Officer of the City's Economic
Development Department, asked to increase the requirement
for on-site affordable units from 10% to 15% (Mayor M. Thomas
Menino 2003). While this suggestion increased the policy's
potential to provide affordable housing, it also eliminated the
private developers' incentive to provide integrated affordable
housing within market-rate developments.
In February 2005 Mayor Menino, through another executive
order in response to rising construction costs, increased the
existing monetary contribution in lieu of the direct on-site or off-
site affordable housing creation from $52,000 to $97,000 per
unit. He also stipulated an annual automatic adjustment of the
affordable housing cost factor based on the index developed
and used by the city's linkage program (City of Boston and Office
of the Mayor Thomas M. Menino 2005, 2). Although the cash-
out fee contribution was increased, it was still deemed lower
than the actual per on-site unit cost (Penniman 2006, 6). Hence,
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the counter-option of the cash-out fee remained appealing to
developers, as opposed to the direct on-site or off-site housing
creation.
In May 2006 the Massachusetts Association of Community
Development Corporations (MACDC) issued a study that
evaluated the five-year implementation results of Boston's IDP
and suggested policy changes. The study indicated that Boston's
IDP had made a significant contribution to the city's affordable
housing stock. It also highlighted key policy weaknesses. The
weaknesses outlined in the report included the executive order
administrative nature of the IDP rather than the less-flexible and
more permanent zoning provision or by-law clause commonly
employed as an administrative tool in other municipalities; the
high levels of household's income targeted; the low cash-out
fee stipulation; Boston's average ranking (in comparison with
other municipalities with inclusionary zoning ordinances) in
producing affordable housing units per capita; the small unit
size of the mixed-income developments that excluded families;
and the added stress created for some of the affordable housing
residents due to the condo fees or special assessment fees
associated with market-rate developments (Penniman 2006).
To address these shortcomings, the MACDC report outlined
key recommendations that included the following: further
increasing the cash-out fees and the adoption of a sliding scale
based upon the construction cost of the market-rate units in
each development; the establishment of a clear and transparent
process for the allocation of inclusionary funds to non-profit and
for-profit developers; the adjustment of the household income
levels serviced through affordable housing created to target
the city's low-income and moderate-income households; the
incorporation of the IDP into the city's zoning ordinance; and the
establishment of explicit and transparent rules for the market-
rate housing developers (Penniman 2006, 5).
In response to the MACDC's concerns and suggestions, in
May 2006 through another executive order, Menino outlined the
following IDP changes:
Affordable household income levels: The new targets were
based on Boston's AMI rather than the MSA. For homeownership
units, affordability targeted households earning between 130%
and 160% of Boston's median household income (BMI). For
rental units, affordability targeted households earning between
100% and 125% of BMI (City of Boston and Office of the Mayor
Thomas M. Menino 2006, 1).
Increase of the cash-out contribution: In the case of
homeownership developments, the developer would pay
$200,000 for each unit or at least an amount equal to half of the
difference between the price of the market-rate unit and the price
of an on-site affordable unit - whichever was greater. For rental
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housing units the cash-out payment was set at $200,000 to be
paid in seven equal installments with the first payment required
prior to issuing the building permit for the project (City of Boston
and Office of the Mayor Thomas M. Menino 2006, 1-2).
Greater Emphasis on targeting resources: Half of the IDP
funds collected through the cash-out option would be used for
the creation or preservation of affordable housing in geographic
areas of the city with less than the citywide average of affordable
housing or in areas that demonstrated a need for affordable
housing preservation or creation (City of Boston and Office of
the Mayor Thomas M. Menino 2006, 2).
Transparency: The development and oversight of a competitive
funding process for awarding funds (City of Boston and Office of
the Mayor Thomas M. Menino 2006, 3).
The 2006 changes revealed implementation constraints
mostly due to the complexity of matching IDP regulations with
other public subsidies targeting households based on the MHI
of the MSA (Geoffrey Lewis, personal interview, February 2011).
In September 2007, through another executive order, Mayor
Menino issued the following changes:
Affordability levels: Returning to using the AMI of the MSA
for defining affordability levels. The new executive order, still in
effect today, stipulated that half of both the on-site and off-site
homeownership housing created should be made affordable to
households earning equal to or less than 80% of the MSA AMI.
The other half should be made available to households earning
between 80-100% of the MSA AMI. The city found these income
levels comparable to 130% and 160% of Boston's Median
Income. The on-site and off-site rental units created should be
made available to households earning equal to or less than 70%
of the MSA AMI. The city found these income levels comparable
to 100% and 125% of Boston's Median Income (City of Boston
and Office of the Mayor Thomas M. Menino 2007). Figure 14
summarizes the inclusionary policy's evolution from 2000 to
today.
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FIGURE 14. INCLUSIONARY ZONING CHANGES TIMELINE
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68 INVESTING (IN) EQUITY
Inclusionary Policy Outcomes
According to BRA's records, to date 1,463 units have been
created or preserved because of Boston's inclusionary policy.
Of these, 883 are owner occupied and 580 are rental homes,
532 service Boston's households with income levels greater than
80% of the Boston Metro AMI, and 931 service households with
income levels equal to or less than 80% of the Boston Metro AMI
(Geoffrey Lewis, personal interview, February 2011). It should be
noted, though, that the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit
Act, widely known as Chapter 40B, defines as affordable units
those that target households earning 80% or below of the AMI.
However, IDP currently defines as affordable units those earning
less than 100% of the MSA AMI, while placing emphasis on
providing half of the affordable homeownership units built for
households earning 80% AMI and all of the affordable rental
units for households earning 70% of AMI (City of Boston and
Office of the Mayor Thomas M. Menino 2007).
During the first phase of LTW (FY2000-FY2003), which
coincided with the first three years of the inclusionary policy's
implementation in Boston, a total of 2,217 affordable housing
units were added in the city, 8% of which were the outcome
of the IDP. Of the total affordable units created, 36% targeted
households earning below 50% AMI; 26% targeted households
DND & B
Unsubsidized
Property
Disposition; 2%
FIGURE 15: FY 2000-FY 2003 AFFORDABLE HOUSING
UNITS PER PROGRAM
RA DND Senior Vacant DND
Abandoned
Building
Programs; 2%
Inclusionary
Development Units:
8%
Adopted from the October 2003 LTW / Completion Report
earning 51-60% AMI; 26% targeted households earning 61-80%,
and 12% targeted households earning 81-120% (City of Boston
and Menino 2003, 11). Figure 15 illustrates the affordable units
created though the different programs available in Boston for all
income levels of below 120% AMI.
Between FY 2004 and FY 2007, a time period characterized
by a strong and growing housing market, a total of 2,213 new
affordable housing units were created in the city. Of those 732
(33%) were created through the IDP without the use of public
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FIGURE 16: FY 2004-FY 2007 IDP AFFORDABLE HOUSING
UNITS PER HOUSEHOLD INCOME
<30% AMI 30%-60% AMI
0 54
0%M 7%
100-120% AMI
305
42%
and 514 rentals. Of those, 44 (4.4% of total) affordable
homeownership units were created through the IDP, while the
policy had not resulted in any rental units (City of Boston 2010,
6). The small number of new units, and hence the small number
of IDP units, is indicative of the most recent economic climate.
60%-80% AMI
327
45%
80%-100% AMI
46
6%
Adopted from the October 2008 LTW // Completion Report
funding (City of Boston and Menino 2008, 5). Figure 16 illustrates
IDP's contribution per household income target in relation to the
total IDP affordable housing created from 2004 to 2007.
Although the third phase of LTW is currently underway, at
the end of 2010 the City issued a midway point progress report
covering FY 2009-2010. That timeframe overlapped with the most
recent recession, which to some extent is still noticeable today.
Until the end of 2010, a total of 1,002 affordable housing units
were created in the city, out of which 488 were homeownership
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The persistence of inequality is rooted in " [...] the challenge to ensure that people of all
backgrounds enjoy access to housing in communities that serve as steppingstones to opportunity,
political influence, and broader social horizons rather than as isolated and isolating traps with
second-class support systems."
Xavier de Souza Briggs, The Geography of Opportunity: Race and Housing Choice in Metropolitan America (2005), pg 3.
BOSTON'S URBAN DEVELOPMENT REDISTRIBUTIVE
POLICIES' SPATIAL OUTCOMES
4. 1 METHODOLOGY
This chapter outlines the methodology for assessing spatial
equity in Boston's geography and examines the outcomes of the
linkage and inclusionary policies in supporting the city achieve
greater levels of income integration. Although spatial equity
can be interpreted in many different ways, driven mostly by
Xavier Brigg's research on the "geography of opportunity" and
David Harvey's theoretical social spatial equity framework, for
the purposes of this research, urban spatial equity translates to
income integration within the city.
Spatial Income Integration
To assess income integration in Boston I use the 1980, 1990,
and 2000 census data, and the 2010 census estimates at the
level of the block group. For each of these years, the median
household income of each block group is divided by the city's
median household income (MHI). The spatial income distribution
figures created illustrate which areas are characterized by lower,
similar, or higher median household incomes than the city at
each time. Supportive figures are created to portray the change
of each block group's MHI between each decade. This change
is calculated as a ratio of each block group's MHI to the MHI of
the overall city within each decade. These figures present an
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additional analytical approach to determining whether spatial
income integration or segregation has occurred in Boston
through time, and they illustrate which parts of the city became
wealthier and which ones poorer.
Spatial Implications of Affordable Housing Supported by
Linkage Funds
Affordable housing projects do not rely solely on funds from the
Neighborhood Housing Trust (NHT) of Boston. On the contrary,
resources from linkage fees supplement other public subsidies in
filling the financial gap of affordable housing units. Therefore, the
location of each affordable development is determined by factors
far beyond the allocation of NHT funds. Furthermore, location is
further confined by broader urban development regulations and
market driven limitations. Despite the supplementary nature of
NHT-assisted affordable units, this study includes an analysis of
the spatial distribution and geographic concentrations of NHT-
assisted units in order to assess whether their creation supports
income integration goals.
Spatial Implications of Affordable Housing Created
through the Inclusionary Development Policy (IDP)
Assessing the capacity of IDP to promote income integration
within the city relies on analyzing the location of the affordable
housing units created as a result of the policy. This study examines
the location of the on-site affordable housing created as part of
the IDP developments. It also examines the portion of the off-site
units, as well as the magnitude of the funds collected through
the cash-out option. Although this study does not include an
analysis of the negotiations associated with determining which
of the three options-on-site, off-site, or cash-out-developers
are asked to comply with, it sheds some light on the possible
negotiation parameters between the private developers and the
Boston Redevelopment Authority in determining the preferred
option.
4. 2 WHO ARE THE PEOPLE SERVICED?
Prior to the spatial analysis of the affordable housing, I attempt
to profile four, four-member households earning incomes of 50%,
70%, 80%, and 100% of AMI as defined by the US Housing and
Urban Development office and the BRA in 2010. Such analysis is
not inclusive of all possible household profiles. It is intended only
to offer the human dimension of the people serviced and thereby
speculate about their everyday needs.
NHT funds target households earning at or below 80% of the
Boston's metropolitan area AMI, with many of them targeting at
or below 50% of AMI (Theresa Gallagher, personal interview,
72 INVESTING (IN) EQUITY
February 2011). The current IDP provisions specify that half of
the inclusionary zoning units for homeownership are meant to
target households earning below 80% of AMI and the other half
households earning between 80% and 100% of AMI. For rental
units IDP targets households earning 70% of AMI and below.
As mentioned in chapter 3, the state's Chapter 40B provision
defines as affordable housing that which targets populations
earning 80% AMI and below. Based on the ES-202 data for
the second quarter of 2010, a possible composition of the
households serviced through these policies today is as follows.
For a household of four, 50 percent affordability equates to a
household income of no more than $45,900. That could mean a
household with one working adult in motor vehicles wholesales
($38,740 annual average wage) or in an electronics and
appliance store ($42,224 annual average wage).
For a household of four, 70 percent affordability equates
to a household income of no more than $64,250. That could
mean a household with one working adult in the administration
of economic programs ($62,296 annual average wage) or two
working adults one of whom works in a clothing store ($25,272
annual average wage) and one in a florist shop ($37,804 annual
average wage).
For a household of four, 80 percent affordability equates to a
household income of no more than $64,400. That could mean
a household with one adult working as a building finishing
contractor ($58,656 annual average wage) or working in the
waste management and remediation services ($58,604). It
could also mean two working adults one of whom works in home
healthcare services ($36,660 annual average wage) and one in
special food services ($26,260 annual average wage).
For a household of four, 100 percent affordability equates to
a household income of no more than $91,800. That could mean
a household with one working adult in ambulatory healthcare
services ($80,236 annual average wage) or working in accounting
and bookkeeping services ($90,012). It could also mean two
working adults, one of whom works in taxi and limo services
($34,684 annual average wage) and one in a psychiatric and
substance abuse hospital ($54,808 annual average wage).
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4. 3 HAs BOSTON BECOME INCOME INTEGRATED?
Spatial income distribution patterns in the city of Boston are
affected by factors far beyond the location of affordable housing
created through IDP and the contribution or allocation of NHT
funds. However, examining the spatial distribution of median
household income through time is an important first step in
assessing whether Boston has attained spatial income integration.
Examining the spatial patterns of the affordable housing created
by the two city-level policies enables an assessment of whether
these two policies have reinforced or undermined the prevalent
patterns.
The spatial income distribution analysis relies on median
household income (MHI) census data on the level of the block
group. Block groups contain generally between 600 and 3,000
people, with an optimum size of 1,500 people (US Census
Bureau HTTP). Since the determining aspect of block groups'
limits is the number of people it includes, the size of their
geographic boundaries varies disproportionately to the density
of the area they encompass. The MHI information is based on the
1980, 1900, and 2000 decennial data, and the 2010 US census
estimates currently available. As the MHI income of Boston
changes over a ten-year period, the MHI of each block group is
divided each time by the MHI of the city in order to identify areas
characterized by lower or higher MHI levels than the city and to
enable the observation and comparison of median household
income spatial patterns through time. Because the linkage
policy was initiated in 1986 and the IDP in 2000, the 1980, 1990,
2000, and 2010 data points allow for an examination of income
distribution prior to and after the implementation of both policies.
In 1980 Boston's median household income was $13,043.
Figure 17 illustrates block groups with MHI levels lower than,
similar to, or higher than Boston's MHI. Although in 1980 there
were clear spatial patterns of MHI distribution, the lowest block
group had no less than 55% and the highest no more than 185%,
of the city's MHI. As illustrated in figure 17, part of Boston's
downtown, North End and Beacon Hill, as well West Roxbury,
Hyde Park, and a large part of Jamaica Plain, were the highest
income areas. Roxbury, the South End, South Boston Fenway,
and part of Dorchester had the highest concentrations of low-
income households.
Areas highlighted in yellow had about the same MHI levels
with the city. Out of the 545 block groups included in the city 234
(42.9%) had MHI below 95% of the city's MHI and 234 (44%)
had MHI above 105% of the city's MHI. It must be noted that MHI
data had a more aggregate format in 1980, resulting in block
groups with similar MHI levels being assigned the exact same
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MHI figure. Hence, the more detailed picture presented in the
following years is not necessarily the outcome of true block-
group MHI changes.
In 1990 the income inequality had grown significantly. The
lowest median household block groups were characterized by
an MHI of less than 35% of the citywide MHI ($29,900) and the
three highest MHI block groups were characterized by an MHI
of 235%, 255% and 285% of Boston's MHI. Roxbury, part of the
South End, downtown (the China town area), Mattapan, and
Fenway included the city's lowest-income population. Out of the
545 block groups in the city 215 (39.5%) had MHI lower than
95% of the city's and 284 (52.2%) had MHI higher than 105%
of the city's. Almost 20% of the block groups had MHI less that
55% of the city's. The Back Bay/Beacon Hill neighborhood, part
of Jamaica Plain and West Roxbury included the city's highest-
income population. South Boston and East Boston started
showing signs of income integration. Overall, in 1990 spatial
income distribution patterns in Boston were clearly identifiable
(figure 18). Either due to the availability of more refined data or
due to true changes, most of the city's wealthy areas had become
wealthier, while most of the city's poor areas had become poorer
during the ten-year period. Figure 19 illustrates the change per
block group as a ratio of the change in the city's MHI between
1980 and 1990.
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City of Boston Median Household Income $13,043
FIGURE 17: MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION, BOSTON 1980
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1980 US Census Data, MIT Geolyrics
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FIGURE 18: MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION, BOSTON 1990
City of Boston Median Household Income $29,900
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FIGURE 19: MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME CHANGE PER BLOCK GROUP, BOSTON 1980-1990
City of Boston Median Household Income Change $16,857
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By 2000, income inequality in the city had amplified further
and its spatial ties remained clearly marked (figure 20). In 2000,
23 block groups had MHI levels over 200% of the city's MHI,
in comparison with only 6 block groups with over 200% of the
city's MHI in 1990. In addition the city's poorest block group had
an MHI of 15% of the city's MHI and 222 block groups had MHI
levels less than 95% of the city's MHI in comparison to the 215
block groups in 1990. In 2000 East Boston had returned to very
low MHI levels, while higher income levels characterized more
areas in South Boston. Roxbury and Fenway continued to have
the city's highest concentration of lower-income people, while
concentrations of lower-income households were also more
evident and geographically further concentrated in Mattapan
and Dorchester. Concentrations of wealthy households had
become even more noticeable in Back Bay/Beacon Hill, Jamaica
Plain, West Roxbury, parts of Charleston, Downtown, and Allston/
Brighton (figure 21).
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FIGURE 20: MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION, BOSTON 2000
City of Boston Median Household Income $39,629
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FIGURE 21: MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME CHANGE PER BLOCK GROUP, BOSTON 1990-2000
City of Boston Median Household Income Change $9,729
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FIGURE 22: MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION, BOSTON 2010
City of Boston Median Household Income Estimate $40,171
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Because the analysis of income distribution for 2010 is based
on the 2010 MHI estimates rather than actual counts, it includes
greater statistical noise and error. Therefore, an analysis of the
MHI change per block group is not included here. However, the
2010 MHI spatial representation is predictable and consistent
with the 2000 patterns and with those that can be observed in
Boston's urban environment today. In 2010, 206 block groups had
an MHI of less than 95% of $40,171, which is Boston's 2010 MHI
estimate. Two hundred seventy-five block groups, in comparison
with 269 in 2000, have an MHI of over 105% of the city's MHI.
As illustrated in the figure 22, the geographic concentration of
wealth and poverty has remained the same, while slight changes
are observed in the South End and in downtown, which have
become less income-integrated since 2000.
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As public housing developments tend to
include large concentrations of low-income
residents, figure 23 presents an overlay of
Boston Housing Authority (BHA) properties
on the 2010 MHI estimates distribution.
Very telling is that the very few lower-
income areas included in some of the city's
wealthier neighborhoods, including the
South End, are the direct outcome of public
housing developments. Therefore, even the
weak income integration patterns observed
in many areas of the city are not the result
of true income integration. Rather they are
the outcome of public housing locations
with thigh concentration of lower income
residents.
FIGURE 23: BHA PROPERTIES OVERLAID IN BOSTON'S INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN 2010
BHA Properties Included in the 2008 City of Boston Assessors Database
84 INVESTING (IN) EQUITY
................................
. FIGURE 23 ENLARGEMENT
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4. 4 HAS THE LINKAGE POLICY SUPPORTED INCOME
INTEGRATION?
Between 1986 and 2005, 6,090 affordable housing units were
created with the support of linkage funds. Of them, over 35%
(2,139) were located in Roxbury and over 14% (866) in the South
End. During the same 19-year period, a total of $80,987,745
NHT funds was used to support the creation of the affordable
housing units. Over 23% ($18,938,736) of the total funds was
allocated to affordable housing creation in Dorchester and
13.5% ($10,931,453) in the South End. Figure 24 includes all of
Boston's neighborhoods based on the percentage of the total
amount of NHT funds they attracted and figure 25 based on the
number of affordable units that were created.
The area identified as central includes downtown and
Chinatown. The relatively high NHT allocation in this area is due
to Chinatown's long history of advocacy and housing creation.
Specifically, out of the total $4,471159 NHT funds $3,751,159
was allocated to Chinatown projects. The remaining $720,000
(0.89% of total) was allocated to the rest of the downtown area.
The relatively high creation of NHT assisted affordable
housing in the Central area is again the result of Chinatown.
Out of the 324 total units created in the Central area, 185 were
in Chinatown. The remaining 139 (2.28% of total NHT assisted
units) were created in the rest of the downtown area.
In an effort to leverage additional private, state, and city funds,
the NHT RFP includes a $50,000 per unit limit. However, there
is variation between the amounts per affordable unit spent in
each neighborhood. Table 6 includes a summary of the NHT per
unit contribution for each of Boston's neighborhoods. Roxbury,
which has attracted the highest amount of NHT funds, has also
been able to leverage additional funds, thereby keeping the NHT
contribution at an overall low average level ($8,854). However,
other neighborhoods such as Fenway, Mattapan, Dorchester, and
East Boston, have also been able to attract a substantial amount
of NHT funds, while they have required the highest average per
unit NHT subsidy. Hence, the ability to leverage additional funds
does not appear to be the greatest priority in the administration
and allocation of linkage funds.
The administration and allocation of NHT funds has well-
defined provisions, a clearly administrated process, and a
transparent, well-advertised funding allocation procedure. In
discussions with nonprofit, affordable housing developers,
it became apparent that they were well informed about the
program's administration and availability of funds. Madison Park
Development Corporation's (MPDC) real estate development
representative indicated that most recently the MPDC was
awarded NHT funds to create a new affordable housing project
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FIGURE 24: SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF NHT FUNDS ALLOCATED, 1986 TO 2005
NHT Funds Allocated Per Neighborhood
As a Ratio of Total NHT funds
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FIGURE 25: SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF NHT ASSISTED AFFORDABLE UNITS, 1986 TO 2005
NHT Assisted Units Per Neighborhood As a Ratio of
Total NHT Assisted Units
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Total NHT Assisted
Units 6,090
TABLE 6: NHT FUNDS PER ASSISTED
UNIT CREATED, 1986-2005
NEIGHBORHOOD AMOUNT SPENT PERAFFORDABLE UNIT
Fenway $27,228
East Boston $24,360
Dorchester $23,312
Mattapan $21,209
Chinatown $20,277
Mission Hill $19,634
South Boston $19,395
Allston-Brighton $18,642
Roslindale $18,220
Jamaica Plain $15,649
Brighton $12,755
South End $12,623
Beacon Hill $9,779
Roxbury $8,854
Charlestown $6,744
Back Bay $6,329
Central $5,180
West End $5,152
City Average $13,298
Department of Neighborhood Development,
2005 NHT Report
in Roxbury that targets populations of various income levels, all of which are below
the 80% AMI target. He also specified that the organization has developed a good
track record working with the city and specifically with DND in creating affordability
options in Roxbury. Some of the developments would have not been possible if
such funds were not available (Personal Interview, March 2011).
Through the current RFP process, NHT funds are used to fill in financial gaps for
affordable housing developments, drawing on additional state and city subsidies.
Per DND's NHT RFP, there is a $750,000 per project and a $50,000 per unit limit.
In addition, funds are applicable only to rental and cooperative housing creation
or preservation (City of Boston and Department of Neighborhood Development
2010). The NHT RFP also stipulates that the targeted affordability levels must be
at or below 80% of AMI, with a minimum of 10% set aside for homeless or formerly
homeless people. DND's affordability requirement for all rental units is in perpetuity
(Department of Neighborhood Development HTTP). Because NHT funds are
allocated through a competitive RFP process, a critical evaluation criterion is the
development team's track record on comparable projects. MPDC's real estate
representative verified that part of the organization's success in attracting such
funds is the long-standing reputation of MPDC in developing affordable housing
in Roxbury.
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FIGURE 26: PERCENTAGE OF NHT ASSISTED AFFORDABLE UNITS (1986 TO 2005) COMPARED TO THE 2005 AFFORDABLE
HOUSING DISTRIBUTION IN THE CITY (40B)
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The use of linkage funds alone does not currently include any
provisions or offer any incentives to create affordable housing in
parts of the city with lower affordability levels. Figure 26 illustrates
the resulting percentages of affordable housing provided in each
neighborhood and compares this geographic distribution with
the housing affordability levels of each neighborhood according
to the 2005 40B report.
It is apparent that the five neighborhoods that attracted the
most funds (Roxbury, South End, Dorchester, Mattapan, and
Jamaica Plain which also includes Mission Hill) drew almost
64.5% of the total funds allocated between 1986 and 2005
and are some of the city's neighborhoods with the highest
concentrations of affordability based on the 2005 40B data.
Similarly, neighborhoods where the most affordable housing units
were created (Roxbury, South End, Charlestown, Dorchester and
Mattapan), almost 68.5% of total NHT units assisted between
1986 and 2005, are (with the exception of Dorchester) the city's
neighborhoods with higher housing affordability concentration
based on the 2005 40B data. All of the neighborhoods, apart from
the South End, have shown strong income segregation patterns
through time and have some of the city's highest concentrations
of low-income households. This analysis is not conclusive as to
whether the geographic distribution of affordable housing created
through other subsidies follows different patterns. Nevertheless,
it reveals that the availability of linkage funds does not promote
spatial income integration. Although these funds increase the
city's capacity to provide much needed affordable housing, their
spatial allocation contributes to income segregation and adds to
the supply of affordable housing in the neighborhoods with high
affordability levels.
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4. 5 HAS THE INCLUSIONARY POLICY SUPPORTED
INCOME INTEGRATION?
The strength of the IDP lies not only in its capacity to create
affordable housing but also in its ability to promote income
integration in Boston. It promotes income integration by
mandating the inclusion of affordable units within market-rate
developments while assigning the additional financial burden
to the private developer. However, due to the options of either
off-site housing creation or cash-outs (in lieu of directly creating
affordable housing), the policy's strength in promoting mixed-
income developments and fostering income integration in the
city is compromised.
Specifically, 115 market-rate housing developments with
over 10 units each have been developed in Boston from 2000
to 2010, adding a total of 7,627 units in the city's housing stock.
Out of the total number of units 929 (12.18%) are characterized
by IDP as affordable and refer to households earning at or below
120% of AMI. The 929 units result in a ratio lower than the 15%
requirement because originally the policy included a 10% on-
site requirement and because a cash-out option is occasionally
negotiated. As it was not possible to obtain data for the affordable
units supported by the IDP funds, it is likely that the overall ratio
is higher than 12.18%. Of the 929 units, 476 (6.12% of total
units) target families earning at or below 80% of AMI. In addition
$9,784,852 has been collected in the IDP fund through the cash-
out option to further support affordable housing creation in the
city (Leading the Way Database, 2010). As mentioned earlier,
units targeting households earning between 80-120% of AMI are
not included in the state's 40B list. However, the policy responds
to the need to develop workforce housing in the city: a need
that is not satisfied by any other city or state programs (Geoffrey
Lewis, personal interview, February 2011). Figure 27 shows the
household income levels of the on-site and off-site affordable
housing creation option through IDP with the exception of
additional units that have been supported by the IDP cash-out
funds.
Negotiations on a case-by-case basis between BRA and the
developer determine which of the three options is agreed upon
each time. Although BRA considers it a priority to include the
affordable units on-site, it evaluates the trade-offs associated
with the cost of creating affordable housing on-site with the
potential to create more affordable units elsewhere through
the use of the collected IDP funds (Geoffrey Lewis, personal
interview, February 2011). Although the desire to optimize the
number of the affordable units provided is rational and justifiable,
the ad-hoc or unpredictable nature of case-by-case negotiations
compromises, and sometimes negates, the policy's spatial
income integration outcomes.
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FIGURE 27: 2000-2010 HOUSEHOLD INCOME LEVELS OF IDP
AFFORDABLE UNITS CREATED
Low
Income
(31%-50%
AMI) .6%
HOME Income
(51%-60% AMI);
A 2%
Lower-Middle a
Income
(81%-100% AMI);
5%
Leading the Way Database, 2010
In addition, the policy still exists only as an executive order
and has not been included in the zoning ordinance. According
to Geoffrey Lewis, senior project manager and assistant director
of policy at BRA, the flexibility inherent in the executive order
status of the IDP has been important in instigating changes within
the short ten-year period since the policy was initiated in order
to best adjust to the city's needs. However, a possible change
in the mayor's seat could mean the elimination of the policy.
Furthermore, the ad-hoc nature of the negotiations between the
individual developers and BRA does not support the presence
of a transparent and predictable process.
The outcome of the negotiation of the different options usually
results in a combination of two or more ways of contribution. For
example, although affordable units may be provided on-site,
sometimes less than fifteen percent of the total units are offered
as affordable. In such cases, the remaining affordable units are
offered either on an off-site location or result in a fee contribution.
Out of the 115 market-rate developments complying with IDP, 84
include all 651 affordable units (below 120% AMI) entirely on-
site, 4 developments with a total of 93 affordable units included
both on-site and off-site options, and 29 more developments with
a total of 2,278 new units included both 180 affordable housing
on-site (7.9%) and monetary contributions (Leading the Way
Database, 2010).
Figure 28 illustrates the on-site affordable housing created
through IDP either when a development offered all or part of
the affordable housing on-site. It overlays the housing location
with the 2005 affordability levels of each neighborhood based
on the states 40B data. Figure 29 depicts the developments that
offered less than the 15% of affordable units on-site while also
making a cash-out contribution. It overlays the on-site housing
locations with revenue collected from residential projects in
each neighborhood that also complied with the cash-out option.
However, there is no indication of where these funds were spent.
Because there are no stipulations mandating that IDP funds
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FIGURE 28: 2000-2010 ON-SITE AFFORDABLE HOUSING CREATED THROUGH IDP (ON-SITE AND PARTIAL OFF-SITE CASES)
COMPARED To THE NEIGHBORHOOD AFFORDABILITY LEVELS (40B) IN 2005
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FIGURE 29: 2000-2010 PARTIAL ON-SITE AFFORDABLE HOUSING CREATED DURING THE CASH-OUT OPTION OVERLAID
WITH REVENUE GENERATED BY THE CASH-OUT OPTION
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should be spent within the same neighborhood or sites adjacent
to the market rate development area, it can be assumed that
they were spent in various parts of the city.
Figure 28 clearly illustrates IDP's capacity to provide
affordable units in central parts of the city characterized by lower
affordability levels. However, figure 29 indicates that the cash-
out option has limited the creation of additional on-site affordable
units in mostly the areas of Fenway/Kenmore, South Boston, and
Central (which includes downtown, Chinatown, and West End).
Obviously, the inclusionary policy has the potential to increase
income integration, not only within each development but also
within the city's geography. However, alternative available
options to on-site housing and the desire to maximize the
number of affordable units in the city compromise the policy's
ability to achieve that goal. This may be of distinct importance
because half of the IDP units are meant to target the city's work-
force population. A narrow opportunity to better integrate work-
force households within the city's higher-income neighborhoods
further exemplifies the constraint in achieving income integration
in the city and reveals a real challenge of existing policies to
overturn market forces and the "business as usual" development
regime.
Figure 30 overlays for each neighborhood the total NHT
assisted units (from 1986 to 2005), the total IDP created affordable
units (from 2000 to 2010), and the total IDP cash-out fees collected
in lieu of creating affordable housing, with the median household
income (MHI) of each neighborhood in 2000. As illustrated,
greater numbers of NHT assisted units are provided in parts of the
city with lower MHI income levels, while IDP affordable units are
mostly concentrated in higher MHI income level neighborhoods.
However, the cash-out option seems to compromise the IDP's
ability to generate greater income integration: in areas such as
Central and South Boston, a large amount of cash-out fees has
been collected in lieu of creating additional affordable units.
However, in the Fenway/Kenmore neighborhood, the cash-out
option has prevented further concentration of affordable units
in a part of the city already characterized by a very low MHI.
The results of this summary are not surprising as linkage fund
allocations lack the spatial emphasis that characterizes the IDP.
However, upon implementation even the IDP does not present
strong enough spatial results to suggest that it could alter the
prevailing income distribution patterns in the city.
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FIGURE 30: TOTAL IDP AFFORDABLE UNITS, NHT-ASSISTED UNITS, AND IDP REVENUE THROUGH THE CASH-OUT OPTION, OVERLAID
WITH 2000 NEIGHBORHOOD MHI LEVELS
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" [...] heritage of progressive politics is important in providing a political
environment conducive to alternative policy strategies."
Edward Goetz, Expanding Possibilities in Local Development Policy (1994), pg 103.
MOVING TOWARDS A SPATIALLY EQUITABLE URBAN LANDSCAPE
This chapter builds upon the analysis unfolded in chapter
4 and attempts to address barriers associated with the spatial
redistribution of affordable housing in the city. It offers suggestions
for how either linkage or inclusionary policy modifications
as well as broader urban development reform could lead to
greater income integration in the city. I recognize that any policy
recommendation should be made with a consideration of market
forces. However, without ignoring the importance of economics,
I formulate these suggestions with a bias toward achieving
greater levels of income integration. Hence, the following
conclusions and suggestions are often speculative in nature
rather than prescriptive of immediately implementable strategies.
Furthermore, I argue that as market forces are cyclical, some of
the suggestions may become more pertinent in the future under
a stronger economic climate, or that they could or should have
occurred during the most recent real estate boom.
The first two sections suggest policy reforms for Boston's
inclusionary and linkage policies that could more strongly
support income integration in the city. Section 3 addresses
urban development reform beyond the two city-level policies
that could impact the city's ability to achieve income integration
and foster spatial equity. Section 4 offers a brief assessment of
the contribution and limitations of this thesis.
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5. 1 (How) CAN THE LINKAGE POLICY CREATE
GREATER INCOME INTEGRATION IN THE CITY?
When initially formed, the linkage policy had explicit spatial
stipulations regarding the allocation of NHT funds. As presented
in chapter 3, ten percent of the linkage funds had to be allocated
in or adjacent to downtown; an additional twenty percent had
to be allocated for affordable housing in close proximity to the
commercial development from which they were exacted. As large
commercial developments are more concentrated in downtown,
the policy could potentially result in the allocation of 30% of the
funds in or adjacent to downtown areas. However, today the
linkage policy lacks such stipulations and it has been relegated
to a supplementary role in increasing public subsidies.
Furthermore, the NHT fund limitation of $750,000 per project
and $50,000 per unit makes the creation of affordable housing
easier in parts of the city with lower land values or in areas
with abundance of city-owned land. As shown in chapter 3
both of these characteristics also have strong spatial ties that
deter income integration. To ascribe explicit spatial emphasis
to the linkage policy (in order to promote income integration),
it is important to address this difference in land values and to
mitigate the additional cost burden they impose on the final per
unit cost. One possible solution could be the allocation of higher
percentages of the overall funds to specific city neighborhoods,
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or to specific areas within each neighborhood. In areas of higher
land values, the policy could allow for a greater per project and
per unit allocation. A greater number of units could mitigate the
increased land value cost. Obviously, such recommendations
may meet with opposition from existing communities that currently
attract large portions of NHT funds, and could compromise the
city's ability to maximize the number of NHT assisted affordable
units created.
Alternatively, the city could set explicit targets for NHT
assisted units in certain areas of the city. In order to mitigate the
implications of the potentially higher land values in these areas,
the city could allow higher densities when affordable units are
included in a development. This strategy, although it may still
meet with community opposition, does not have to compromise
the final number of NHT assisted units: the additional per unit
cost will be lowered due to the higher density provision.
Important to these recommendations is defining the areas
of the city where more affordable housing should be created.
Although income integration is one way of assessing spatial
equity, the identification of the target areas should not be
made with income integration as the sole criterion. It is highly
likely that the higher income areas of the city are also the ones
offering better services to residents. However, driven by Xavier
Briggs' advocacy of a "geography of opportunity," such areas
might also be identified based on quality of life indicators such
as access to public amenities, low crime rates, infrastructure
upgrades and more. Hence, first there is a need to identify a set
of explicit indicators that create opportunity and betterment for
lower- and middle- income residents. Based on those indicators,
linkage policy provisions should identify the areas targeted for
either the allocation of a higher percentage of NHT funds, or
for a greater number of NHT assisted units and higher density
provisions. These decisions should also consider the market
barriers associated with developing affordable housing.
Furthermore, currently NHT funds are allocated for the
creation of affordable housing and job training efforts. Because
the policy emerged out of community unrest and political
advocacy seeking to extend the economic benefits created from
downtown developments to the city's neighborhoods, there may
be alternative ways of achieving this goal beyond the two current
efforts. One such alternative may come through requirements to
directly employ lower- and middle- income city residents in the
private market jobs created (other than those available during
construction) in the new commercial developments. Access to
these jobs by existing residents with less income capacity may
benefit the city more than the creation of affordable housing.
It may increase household income, and hence decrease
affordability needs. Evidently, such provisions will have to
be crafted in accordance with labor market experts and will
have to be negotiated with the business community. Although
such proposals have occasionally been suggested through
Community Benefits Agreements (CBA), they may include
unintended labor market implications and can be very difficult to
administer. However, I find that the in ability to adequately solve
housing affordability and spatial inequity through the single lens
of housing policies is becoming increasingly clear.
Moreover, it may be of merit to shift the conversation away
from the goal of de-concentrating affordable housing units and
toward attracting more market rate households in the lower
income parts of the city. This shift could possibly occur through
directing a portion of the NHT funds toward public facilities,
infrastructure improvements, urban design enrichments, public
services, or other offerings lacking in areas of the city already
characterized by high concentrations of affordable housing.
However, as targeting resources for such purposes may also
increase housing prices and rents, such provisions should
come with very stringent affordability restrictions for the existing
affordable housing stock. Such enhancements could impel higher
income residents to a lower-income neighborhood, generating
in this way a mixed income environment, one that results from
extension of resources rather than de-concentration of affordable
housing, and from infusion of higher-income households in
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neighborhoods of higher affordability. That approach suggests
not only the possibility of fostering income integration but also
the betterment of the city's lower- and middle- income residents,
even if income integration is not to be achieved.
Obviously, a large enough impact could not be achieved
through the use of NHT funds alone. However, NHT funds could
leverage additional capital improvement funds, creating in this
way greater emphasis on improvements in the city's lower-
income areas. Although such a proposal demands rigorous
interdepartmental collaboration, requires strong political will,
and needs to avoid impacting negatively other parts of the city
(the ones that will receive less attention), it has the potential to
mitigate spatial inequality. In many ways, this strategy suggests
a reversal of the older redlining process that deprived many
city areas. It suggests directing a greater portion of public
investment toward the more impoverished parts of the city.
However, it is likely that such proposal will be met with opposition
from city residents paying higher property or income taxes if the
targeted areas exclude their neighborhoods. However, spatial
equity may never be adequately solved through housing policies
alone; hence, an interdepartmental collaboration could offer an
appropriate avenue.
5. 2 (How) CAN THE INCLUSIONARY POLICY CREATE
GREATER INCOME INTEGRATION IN THE CITY?
Before addressing the IDP's potential to foster income
integration in the city, it is important to highlight the policy's
constraints due to its executive order status and the ad-hoc nature
of the case-by-case negotiations between developers and the
BRA. The uncertainly that these conditions impose compromises
IDP's strength. The lack of explicit criteria that would guide
decisions regarding the three alternative options, while offering
appropriate cost-mitigation strategies (other than zoning relief),
is likely to increase developers' leverage during the negotiations
with BRA. The city is presumably in a particularly disadvantaged
position especially during weak market conditions.
However, as demonstrated in chapter 4, IDP in many cases
has resulted not only in creating affordable units in wealthier parts
of the city, but also in creating income integrated developments.
Hence, although the impact of the policy is not enough to
disrupt prevailing income distribution patterns, it can be used
as a reference for other housing policies that lack any explicit
spatial stipulations. More importantly, there is potential to create
synergies between IDP and additional public subsidy programs.
These synergies can generate incentives for developers to create
more affordable units, possibly for lower-income households,
within the market rate developments.
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One such possible synergy can be built with the tax-exempt
financing program offered by Mass Housing that applies to
mixed-income rental developments and that can be used for up
to 90% of the project's appraised value. Eligible developments
are those with 20% of the units targeted for households earning
50% or less of AMI or with 40% or more of units targeted for
households earning 60% of AMI. A few cases in Boston
have utilized this option, increasing in this way the number of
affordable units and lowering the affordability targets within the
mixed-income development. However, pursing this synergy
is not explicitly incentivized or regulated, leaving the option
of its use to the discretion of each developer. It is possible to
assume that synergies such as the tax-exempt financing can be
built into IDP's stipulations, either through incentives or through
direct regulation. Specifically, stipulations to utilize such or other
synergies could be mandated in areas of the city characterized
by less income integration, higher land values, less available
developable land, and strong market trends. In parts of the city
with high affordability levels and abundance of (public) land, the
same stipulation can be simply recommended.
As presented in chapter 3, in 2000, when IDP was first formed,
it mandated different percentage requirements for each of the
three options. However, in an effort to maximize the number
of affordable units created, the on-site contribution was later
increased to the same (15%) level required by the off-site and
cash-out alternatives. The policy's potential to generate income
integration could be increased by assigning different affordable
unit percentage targets for each alternative option, thus making
the on-site option more appealing to developers. Furthermore,
it is likely to propose a variation in the percentage requirements
contingent on the location of the residential development.
Higher percentage requirements will be suitable for areas of
the city characterized by greater development activity and less
income integration, while lower percentage requirements may
be more appropriate in areas with the opposite characteristics.
As presented in chapter 2, the current affordability levels of the
city do not adequately address all those in need of affordable
housing. Hence, increasing affordability requirements in certain
parts of the city will not only help achieve income integration but
will also address the inadequate affordable housing supply.
Any of the suggestions outlined above would ideally
require explicit provisions and a predictable and regulated
implementation of the policy. This in turn would require including
the inclusionary policy in the city's ordinance in order to make its
administration clear and predictable to both developers and city
planners. Naturally, forming these more aggressive provisions
while ascribing a permanent status to the IDP is contingent on
market conditions. Such policy modifications are likely to be
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successfully implemented when market conditions are strong:
they could have occurred during the recent real estate boom,
or may occur in the future when market conditions improve.
Moreover, any policy recommendations should be coupled with
cost burden mitigation strategies to ensure that they will not
adversely impact land values or market rate housing prices.
5. 3 (How) COULD THE REFORM OF URBAN
DEVELOPMENT FOSTER SPATIAL EQuITY?
This section includes suggestions for reforming urban
development policies or for forming new ones in order to allow for
the possibility of a more equitable urban landscape to emerge.
This section purposefully deals with the housing affordability issue
beyond the specifics of the two housing affordability policies that
this thesis examines. My argument is that affordable housing,
its location, and the "geography of opportunity" it attains or fails
to create are larger issues of urban development regimes and
outcomes and as such cannot be solved by housing policies
alone. Although the propositions outlined below are not always
directly associated with the linkage and inclusionary policy of
Boston, they emerged out of the research findings. The main
goal of this section is to question "urban development panacea"
assumptions, and to initiate a conversation about supplementary
local level redistribution methods that address and further
support spatial equity.
Is Framing Spatial Equity As Income Integration the
Right Framework?
Striving to include goals that promote income integration in
citywide policies is neither inconsequential nor without equity
implications. However, the income integration goal lacks an
explicit argument or explanation as to why income integration
is important or why it addresses spatial urban inequality. The
lack of such an explicitly statement about the benefits of such a
goal, along with the constraints and difficulties of implementing
strategies that aim to foster spatial income integration under the
"business as usual" axiom, may very well be one reason that this
goal remains unmet.
Hence, defining a goal that is more explicitly linked to offering
people of lower income levels a "geography of opportunity," as
explained by Xavier Briggs, may result in more assertive policies
with more identifiable outcomes. In that case income integration
may be realized as an implication of policies rather than as
the main objective. Thus, it is imperative to define housing
affordability beyond the context of housing policies alone. Under
that framework, there is an advantage to redefining the dearth
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and the need for affordability in a way that is integrated with larger
urban development matters. Therefore, it is possible to form
policy provisions that require, for example, affordable housing
to be located in areas of the city: i) close to T stops, ii) where
the crime rates are lower than the citywide average, iii) where
public schools perform at or above the city level standards, iv)
that have an array of well functioning public facilities, v) that are
characterized by significant capital improvement investments,
and vi) that are characterized by a well maintained urban realm.
These spatial requirements provide a basis for a better quality of
life, or at least a way to reverse the negative, albeit accidental
and unintentional, implications created by the non-spatial
emphases of current policies. Indirectly, these are a few of the
indicators that imply wealthier locations, and offer the possibility
of de-concentrating lower-income people.
Evidently, the implementation of such criteria will face
constraints imposed by (public) land availability, market forces
and private investment trends, which typically follow public
infrastructure improvements and better schools. Constraints may
also be imposed by an increased per affordable housing unit
cost in areas that lack available public land. However, the lack
of planning and the notion of only following market forces is a
mere consequence of neoliberalism that, as this thesis suggests,
has been a source of inequity. Establishing such criteria has the
potential to result in more income integrated neighborhoods,
without explicitly stating income integration as a goal.
As discussed earlier in the linkage policy reform suggestions,
it may be of merit to shift the emphasis from the location of
affordable housing per se, to the geographic distribution of
funds for public improvements. Challenges associated with
this approach include the disapproval of citizens paying higher
property and income taxes to the city if a consequence of the
policy implementation is the disproportionate allocation of
resources in areas of the city other than their own communities.
However, different policy models can be explored where
additional property tax revenues resulting from commercial real
estate development in downtown or in the city's wealthier areas,
are directed toward public resources in parts of the city with high
concentrations of affordable housing, lower income levels, and
greater needs for better public services and public infrastructure.
This model ultimately proposes almost the opposite of a
tax increment financing (TIF) district and suggests a different
method of city-level redistribution. This method places more
emphasis on the quality of life and the opportunity created for
the lower income population of the city, rather than the amount of
affordable housing produced, without necessarily compromising
the quantity of affordable housing created. Clearly, any policy
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that targets lower income areas of the city, especially areas
characterized by higher percentages of rental housing, will have
to include clearly articulated and stringent housing affordability
stipulations to prevent indirect displacement of existing lower-,
moderate- or middle income residents. Income integration could
still be achieved since lower densities and higher concentrations
of vacant buildings and sites characterize many lower-income
areas in the city. Hence, additional housing creation and
household income integration does not have to entail the
displacement of the people already living in an area.
(When) Is Income Integration Attainable?
Some of the city's wealthier areas, such as Back Bay and
Beacon Hill, demonstrate very strong income patterns. The
fact that these areas are considered fully developed (due to
historical and neighborhood character standards) implies major
constraints in achieving income integration. However, the case of
the South End suggests that, during the development period of
an area, a proactive approach to including housing that targets a
variety of income level residents is possible and can create long-
term income diversity patterns. Hence, in lieu of over spending
resources and over extending efforts to create greater income
mix in few of the city's areas (a highly reactive approach), it may
be more effective to focus efforts on employing a more proactive
approach in the city's developing areas. The case of South
Boston is an example of such an opportunity. It is possible to
imagine that more stringent requirements for creating affordable
housing in South Boston, or in other centrally located areas
experiencing intense development and growth in the future, can
be required not only through the IDP policy but also through
the city's urban development and affordable housing agenda.
Similarly to previous recommendations, such requirements will
have to be attentive to market forces and will have to be coupled
with cost burden mitigation strategies and provisions.
More importantly, as portrayed in the case of the South
End, proactive income integration strategies require not only
progressive local politics but also active and strong community
advocacy. As will be further analyzed below, community
advocacy tends to be geographically confined and less visible at
a city-level scale. Hence, a proactive strategy may not become
pressing if intense development occurs in parts of the city
with weak community leadership. However, the city of Boston
has historically demonstrated strong examples of community
advocacy. Thus, it is crucial to explore ways in which community
advocacy can extend beyond the area of influence of a specific
organization and create greater capacity through encouraging
collaboration among community organizations.
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(How) Could CDCs Provide Affordable Housing That
Advances Income Integration?
Community Development Corporations (CDCs) are typically
more active in areas of the city with lower-income levels. They
become naturally the advocates and generators of affordable
housing in the areas in which they operate. Hence, it can be
argued that they contribute to the creation of affordable housing
concentrations in the city's lower income areas. As reported
in the LTW I report, by 2004 34% of Boston's new affordable
housing was created by CDCs. In addition, from 1986 to 2005
$18,938,736 NHT funds (23.38% of total) were allocated to
Roxbury, where the local CDC has a strong track record in
creating affordable housing. In the same period 2,139 number
of affordable housing units supported by NHT funds (a 35.12%
of the total affordable housing units created with the support
of NHT funds) were created in Roxbury. In a discussion with
the real estate project manager of Madison Park Development
Corporation, it was noted that the organization has built a long-
term trust relationship with the city and has a good track record
of applying for and being awarded funds for the creation of
affordable housing (Personal interview, March 2011).
The significance of CDCs in advocating for resources for
lower-income communities and for providing affordable housing
is indisputable. As their ability to attract public subsidies
suggests, the city has ascribed great importance to CDCs in
terms of creating affordable housing. Therefore, it is worthwhile
to explore how the decentralized system that characterizes the
operation of CDCs can be reformed to maintain the positive
outcomes of creating affordable housing while at the same time
being informed and informing larger scale city strategies and
goals.
It is possible to imagine a new CDC model that acts in a
certain capacity at a city-level scale. Specifically, in order to
mitigate the effects created due to the presence or absence of
CDCs from certain neighborhoods, as well as the implications of
CDCs' different capacity and staff expertise, it may be of merit
to explore the possibility of forming a non-profit real estate city-
level entity. Such an entity could be supported by existing local
CDC real estate experts as well as additional (private sector)
developers and affordable housing experts and will have the
capacity to assume real estate responsibilities and undertake
affordable housing development projects throughout the city. The
city level actions of the entity will make the creation of affordable
housing more likely in parts of the city that currently do not have
or have limited capacity CDCs.
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Moreover, such an entity might have the potential to elevate
to the scale of the city community level real estate expertise
over the complexities associated with the creation of affordable
housing. Furthermore, this entity's contribution does not have to
be beneficial only on the city level. By assuming city level activity
and influence (non-profit) real estate professionals can obtain
a more comprehensive view of Boston's affordability challenges
and can inform or reframe their own decisions and undertakings.
In addition, it may become easier for the city to coordinate fund
allocations and affordable housing creation through a single
entity that has the potential to alleviate competition due to
capacity challenges between the different CDCs.
The institution of such an entity and the specifics of its powers
and operations are contingent on political, community, and
market interests. It is likely that areas where local CDCs have
shown great activity and success will be unwilling to share their
staff capacity and expertise, while areas with weaker CDCs may
see the potential that this entity could provide. Moreover, the role
of the non-profit city-level entity will have to be clearly articulated
in order to minimize conflicts with the for profit development
community. Assigning a city-level scale to CDCs does not mean
that their local ties, operations and influence is not important. On
the contrary, it means that their activities should be protected
and maintained. CDCs undertake many other functions besides
affordable housing creation, and such activities associated with
community advocacy, job training, educational programs, and
additional economic development activities, need to remain
local in order to ensure that specialized services and resources
are available to local communities that need them the most.
However, interaction and information sharing between local
CDCs and the city-level entity regarding affordable housing
creation undertakings can prove beneficial for both. The close
interaction of the city-level real estate entity with local CDCs is
critical to foster the legitimacy of its operations at the local level
as well as to ensure that city level efforts will not be perceived as
unresponsive at the local level.
Could Density Provisions Deflate the Affordable
Housing Cost Barrier?
The literature on inclusionary zoning reveals a great concern
over the impacts of the policy on land values. Furthermore,
affordable housing developments tend to occur on city-owned
land or look for sites where land values are low. Either way, there are
disadvantages. In the case of the inclusionary policy, especially
if it is to include additional provisions that further promote mixed
income environments, developer pressure and negotiations with
landowners may depress land prices or increase market rate
unit prices. In the case of the NHT fund allocation (or for that
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matter any public subsidy allocation), affordable developments
are concentrated due to the concentration of city-owned and
lower value land. To address these constraints it is important to
examine ways that additional land costs could be mitigated.
A possible solution, one that builds upon Stephen Coyle's
model for the establishment of the linkage policy, is to gain a
greater understanding of private developers' risks and returns
on their investment. This way, a local government can assign
maximum limits on the investment's return. Such a strategy,
however, requires public sector agencies to have deep real
estate expertise, and to be able to adjust their requirements
based on the market cycles. Such a complex system will have
to be implemented with sophistication in order to avoid deterring
market driven development altogether. In addition, it assumes a
level of regulation that is not only unfamiliar but may also invite
litigation. For these reasons, such an approach may not be
feasible.
A safer alternative solution could entail re-examining density
options. It is likely that increased density can mitigate per unit
costs. As BRA's senior project manager Geoffrey Lewis indicated,
during a recent IDP project negotiation it was decided to agree
upon the cash-out option, as the per unit cost was estimated
to be $600,000 (Geoffrey Lewis, personal interview, February
2011). The higher per unit cost of the development is partly due
to its high-luxury nature and partially due to the high land value
of the site. A higher density can resolve the land value constraint.
Although unrestricted densities are not a solution, there is not
necessarily a direct counter-correlation between higher density
development and architectural articulation or quality.
Although Boston has shied away from structural density
bonuses because of the emphasis on historic preservation (Sheila
Dillon, personal interview, March 2011), it is likely that a discussion
over density will be of merit. Re-examining density provisions in
Boston will require a comprehensive city level approach in order
to identify the areas of the city where additional density will be
allowed in a way that promotes an overall positive physical urban
design outcome. Density provisions will have to be married with
design standards and architectural design reviews regarding the
building's articulation and could be restricted to mixed-income
or affordable housing developments. In that case, higher density
can decrease the per unit average cost and allow creation of
more affordable housing in parts of the city with higher land
values. Additionally, employing higher density strategies can
mitigate possible negative impacts of IDP on land values and
market rate unit prices in the city. However, both urban design
and architectural considerations are of key importance in order
to avoid creating a formulaic urban design image such as the
one that characterizes public housing developments.
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Moving Beyond Municipal Boundaries?
Municipal boundaries can present a paradox. They have
been formed and altered through time as a response to changing
social, cultural, and economic conditions, and ultimately they
constitute a place's identity. Municipal boundaries also confine
the formation and implementation of local policies that, in turn,
contribute to the identity of a place and impact community
characteristics. However, as can be experienced in Boston,
Cambridge, and Brookline municipal boundaries are not
noticeable when localities share similar market economies,
political agendas, and most importantly, populations. Living
in Cambridge while working in Boston or Brookline and vice
versa is not only entirely possible but also likely. Their municipal
boundaries are in many ways invisible. Yet local policies aiming
to address social issues are restricted within the very same
municipal boundaries although their implications may far exceed
them.
My thesis offers evidence of this paradox, which can ultimately
become a misfortune for the planning profession. In undertaking
a study of housing affordability and spatial equity, issues that
could be studied in many other US municipalities, I chose as
the vehicle of exploration two city-level redistributive policies.
However, issues around the unequal geography of opportunity
result from urban development challenges that exceed in
scope these two policies and surpass in geography Boston's
city boundaries. Although the municipal boundaries' power
over the everyday experience of a place can be irrelevant,
these boundaries restrict the possibilities for local planning
intervention. In the absence of a research undertaking that could
advocate for the multiple benefits that the amalgamation of the
three cities' boundaries could have, and in lieu of advocating for
regional planning as the solution to any planning issue, I suggest
that there is merit in pursuing intergovernmental collaboration
when addressing policy issues around adjacent municipalities'
common challenges that can have impacts that extend beyond
single municipal boundaries. The synergies that could be built
between Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline present an excellent
case.
These cities present many cultural and market commonalities.
More importantly, in a person's everyday experience, they are
ultimately one city. Hence, it is not difficult to envision the benefits
resulting from potential shared development and housing policies.
First and foremost, such intergovernmental collaboration on
social policy issues could mitigate the competitive relationship
that adjacent municipalities typically bear when implementing
social policies, and could increase the local governments'
leverage while negotiating with private market entities. Clearly,
the formation of such shared policies will have to be based on
110 INVESTING (IN) EIiTY
shared goals, political will, social, and market considerations.
The scale of the social issues that municipalities are called to
address and the scale of the resources available to them are
often at odds, which makes redistribution on the local level a
greatly challenging task. When localities share commonalities,
like those observed between Boston, Cambridge, and Brookline
intergovernmental collaboration can become an integral part of
a more effective and assertive local government intervention.
5. 4 EPILOGUE
Spatial equity, social cost, redistribution, justice, and public
interest, are all terms with multiple meanings, framed by the
ideological and political regime within which they emerge. This
thesis is biased. The bias derives from defining these terms in
the absolute. Yet such a stance does not emerge from a failure to
consider the contexts that influence their meaning. I argue that
such a bias is necessary in order to provoke a discussion that
may increase spatial equity awareness. Although this bias can
be perceived as authoritarian, I argue that a counter-proposal
that advocates for perpetuating a business-as-usual state of
affairs would only support a regime of unequal opportunity that
has generated implications reaching far more people than those
underprivileged.
The most important limitation of this thesis is that although
it recognizes the value in advocating for a "geography of
opportunity," through the research question that it explores, it
does not address the issue of housing location choice. Income
integration has become a major policy hope. Yet this thesis falls
short of discussing how such a goal could also incorporate
location choice rather than merely advocating for policies and
urban development reforms that would produce more mixed-
income environments. While I am not entirely apprehensive about
social engineering proposals, I deem of greatest importance
the need to couple the suggestions outlined in chapter 5 with
provisions that allow the people targeted by these policies to
choose the location of their homes. Under that assumption,
the recommendations offered intend to increase rather than
dictate people's housing location choice. This approach has the
capacity to account for cultural, racial, and community aspects
and preferences that income integration alone does not address.
Ultimately, this thesis is privileged by having the opportunity to
offer policy suggestions and to speculate on urban development
reforms with Boston's unique political and economic context
as a background. Boston enjoys a long-standing sophisticated
local government, and is also known for its history of community
advocacy and democratic values. In many other US cities, such a
regime is not only unfamiliar but also undervalued. Using Boston
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as the backdrop to frame issues of spatial equity is a conscious
effort that allows for a bolder exploration of planning decisions
and urban development reforms. It allows us to speculate on
how such decisions could lead to the manifestation of equity in
the urban landscape, and hence to speculate on the possibility
that such an urban landscape could in turn instigate the reform
of social and political regimes.
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